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 ABSTRACT 
Emergency response time is very important to first responders. In an emergency, there are many 
factors that can affect the response time. This research focuses on three of the many factors that 
contribute to delays in reaching an incident within the four minute target travel time. Highway-
railway grade crossings, fire equipment allocation and multiple incident occurrences in a fire 
district can have significant impact on emergency response time. 
The operations of slow or stationary freight trains at highway-grade crossings, for instance, 
can lead to delays. This situation is common in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Even though grade 
separation can be the best alternative to solve this problem, it cannot be justified for most grade 
crossings. Using a grade crossing monitoring system (GCMS), real-time information can be 
communicated to local emergency dispatchers when a grade crossing is blocked. The benefit of 
installing a monitoring system was investigated to help improve emergency response time. In this 
research, Geographical Information System (GIS) based service area and network analysis was 
used to investigate the dynamic changes in the service area with or without grade crossing blockage 
and to estimate the benefit of installing GCMS to reduce first responders’ emergency response 
time. The research analyses show significant time saved in emergency response times. The 
Saskatoon examples show; the assumption that a road is blocked and having to take long detours 
when GCMS indicates that the crossing is not blocked and when GCMS also indicates that waiting 
at a blocked crossing would be more efficient than taking a detour route could help save valuable 
time in emergency response. 
All fire related incidents require a standard fire engine. However, some fire outbreaks that 
involve high rise buildings, hazardous materials, and the like, require a special fire engine and/or 
special equipment in addition to the standard fire engine. Special equipment includes a “ladder-
equipped” fire engine, and a “decontamination” fire engine. It is important for a city to have a 
well-structured and efficient strategy to allocate fire and emergency equipment. The allocation of 
resources must take into account changing patterns of fire and emergency incidents. 
This research analyzed response times to fire incidents that require a specific fire engine 
with special features. The results suggest that Saskatoon Fire Department (SFD) may need 
additional resources such as ladders and tankers in order to respond efficiently. Saskatoon Fire 
Department’s target response time is six minutes. Travel time accounts for four of the six minutes. 
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The research developed a spatio-temporal response zone and found that some fire incidents 
requiring specific resources lay outside the four minute zone. The analysis suggests that specific 
types of fire engines could be better allocated to fire districts with more fire incidents requiring 
those engines. 
In Saskatoon, the fire department experiences frequent and multiple emergency calls in 
some of its fire districts which normally have an impact on the response time to individual 
incidents. The potential occurrence of multiple incidents in more than one fire district, makes it 
important for Saskatoon Fire Department to predict the periods during which a particular fire 
district may require an additional fire engine. When multiple calls occur, response times may 
increase due to the lack of a fire engine or secondary fire engine with the required equipment to 
handle more than one emergency call. The pre-emptive reallocation of a fire engine refers to the 
systematic reallocation of a secondary fire engine and its associated fire fighters in a way that 
temporarily transfers the services of the secondary fire engine from its original fire district to 
another fire district when a high number of service calls is expected in the other district. Pre-
emptive reallocation of fire engines for pre-set short-term periods could be a promising way to 
respond to multiple concurrent incidents.  
This research develops a novel, data-driven and scientific approach to assist decision 
making relating to the pre-emptive reallocation of one or more specific types of fire engines for 
fire departments where multiple fire or other emergency incidents may be expected to occur 
concurrently in the fire districts. Pre-emptive reallocation could be a very useful tactic particularly 
for some fire districts in Saskatoon, where the fire stations lack a secondary fire engine and have 
difficulty meeting the important six-minute rule. The approach to pre-emptive reallocation is 
designed to strengthen overall fire services in a region by using existing fire service resources more 
effectively and more efficiently.  
Survival data analyses were used to develop a set of statistical models designed to 
determine the possible time window for fire engine pre-emptive reallocation from fire district (FS) 
#2 or FS #8 to FS #9 to handle multiple fire incidents in fire district #9. The results from the 
analyses show that there are high chances of risk for an Alarm reported incident occurring during 
peak hours, summer season and on weekends in fire district #9. Fire district #8 provides the 
possible alternate chances to pre-empt reallocation of one of its fire engine to district #9.  
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The result from this research demonstrates the benefit and importance of having GCMS 
and reallocation of fire engines with special features to improve emergency response time. This 
research would help enhance emergency response delivery during multiple incidents occurring in 
district#9, that requires pre-emptive reallocation of a fire engine. The outcome of this thesis will 
help save lives, property damage and improve security and safety. 
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CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.   Background 
First responders such as members of the Fire Department, render essential emergency services that 
provide immediate response to emergency situations in a community or the city. The goal of every 
fire department is to avert or limit as much as possible the loss of lives and property damage as a 
result of fire outbreaks. For this reason, a delay in emergency response time can significantly affect 
the effort of first responders, because the success of every emergency response is always measured 
in minutes and seconds. According to the Council of Canadian Fire Marshals and Fire 
Commissioners (CCFM/FC) report on fire losses in Canada, there were 42,753 fires (structural, 
vehicle and outdoor) recorded for 2007 from British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia; for 2008 from Saskatchewan; and for 2003 to 2007 from Northwest 
Territories. These incidents resulted in 224 deaths and more than one billion dollars’ worth of 
property damage. The CCFM/FC analysis shows that 54% of the 42,753 fires were related to 
structural fires (e.g., fires associated with the structural components of residential, commercial or 
industrial buildings), 19% were related to vehicle collisions, and 25% were related to outdoor fires 
(e.g., wildfires) (CCFM/FC, 2011). 
In Saskatoon, Saskatchewan (SK), a total of 22,618 incidents were experienced between 
2009 and 2013. During this five-year period, 39% of the incidents were recorded as dangerous 
goods related incidents (motor vehicle accident clean up, needle disposal, spills and leaks, carbon 
monoxide detector warnings), 38% recorded as alarm incidents (alarm bells ringing: commercial 
and residential structures, alarm carbon monoxide detector sound) and 23% recorded as fire 
incidents (fire smoke in commercial and residential structures, fire in vehicle engine, outdoor fire). 
Figure 1-1a and 1-1b show the total number of all reported incidents by year and by month from 
2009 to 2013. The year 2009 shows a slightly higher number of incidents than years 2010 to 2013. 
The months of April and May had the highest number of incidents. Figure 1-1c and 1-1d show 
seasonal and daily fire incidents. There were fewer incidents in winter. There was no clear pattern 
in the number of incidents by day of the week but Sundays tended to have slightly fewer incidents.  
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                                   (c)                                                                       (d) 
Figure 1-1. Total Number of Fire Incidents in Saskatoon by (a) Year (b) Month (c) Season 
and (d) Day of Week 
                                      
 
 
3 
 
The response time to these incidents is very critical to the fire department in order to ensure 
the efficient delivery of quality and effective fire prevention. The emergency response time to an 
incident can be defined as the duration between the time at which an emergency call is received at 
the fire station, and the time at which an emergency vehicle arrives at the location of the incident 
(Haghani and Yang, 2007). The recommended target emergency response time by the International 
Association of Fire Fighters, for most jurisdictions in North America and other European countries, 
reads “… the fire department shall establish a time objective of four minutes (240 seconds) or less 
for the arrival of the first arriving engine company at a fire suppression incident…”(NFPA, 2002). 
The Saskatoon Fire Department target response time to an incident is within six minutes. 
The six minutes includes one minute for emergency call handling time (i.e., 911 call), one minute 
of fire fighters’ preparation time, and four minutes of journey time. This target response time is in 
accordance with the NFPA specific standard on response time. In Saskatoon, when an emergency 
situation arises, there are a number of factors that prevent the fire department from meeting the 
four minute target journey time. These factors are: traffic congestion, fire equipment allocation 
(i.e., the assigning of fire equipment in fire stations for effective emergency response), grade 
crossing blockage, weather conditions, construction work zones, the location of an incident and 
multiple incident occurrences in the same fire district. This research will focus on three of these 
factors to investigate how they contribute to delays in reaching an incident for first responders. 
These factors include: 
▪ Grade crossing blockage,  
▪ Fire equipment allocation  
▪ Multiple incident occurrences that requires pre-emptive reallocation of fire engines from 
different fire districts.  
This research analysed the impact of grade crossing blockage and fire equipment allocation 
on emergency response time and the risk in chances of occurrence of multiple incidents that require 
pre-emptive reallocation of fire engines. Figure 1-2 shows that the response time to most incidents 
in Saskatoon was between 6 and 8 minutes during the study period (2009-2013). The number of 
incidents recorded within the four-minute target response time were 1,832 (8.3%). The following 
paragraphs discuss an overview of the impact of grade crossing blockage and fire equipment 
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allocation on emergency response time and the risk of multiple incident occurrences that requires 
pre-emptive reallocation of fire engines. 
 
Figure 1-2. Response Time for Incidents in all Fire Districts 
 
The first factor that affects emergency response time is grade crossing blockage. In North 
America and other jurisdictions, railway crossing blockage is a major cause of delay to emergency 
response vehicles. There are approximately 261,000 at-grade public rail crossings in North 
America and 33,000 in Canada. In Saskatoon, there are 58 at-grade crossings. A public grade 
crossing refers to an intersection of a railway track and road at the same level which is designed 
for public use and opened or maintained by a road authority. What are the consequences for 
emergency first responders’ response time when trains block these crossings? Delays at blocked 
grade crossings can clearly have a major impact on first responders.  
The US Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) does not set a maximum time that slow 
moving or stationary trains can block traffic at grade crossings (FRA, 2008), but many states have 
their own legislation and/or administration code. In the state of Washington, for instance, the 
Washington Administration Code (WAC) 480-62-220 states that “…railroad companies must not 
block a grade crossing for more than ten consecutive minutes…” A ten-minute limit is also applied 
in a number of other states, including Texas (Texas Transportation Code, 1999) and Nebraska 
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(NDOR, 2013). No state currently allows trains to block a grade crossing for more than 20 minutes 
(FRA, 2008).  
In Canada, according to the Canadian Rail Operating Rule (CROR) 103(d) that governs 
the time a train may block a railway crossing: “…no part of a movement may be allowed to stand 
on any part of a public crossing at grade, for a longer period than five minutes, when vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic requires passage. Switching operations at such crossing must not obstruct 
vehicular or pedestrian traffic for a longer period than five minutes at a time…” (Transport 
Canada, 2013). In practice, however, Canadian provincial railway officials are well-informed that 
it is not rare for vehicles to have to wait 20 minutes or longer at grade crossings in Canadian cities, 
which violates CROR’s five-minute limit.  
The City of Saskatoon, for example, frequently experiences the passage of trains on a daily 
bases. This usually creates long delays, especially when these trains are on spur lines; the delays 
often far exceed five minutes. Spur lines are used mainly for loading, unloading or marshalling 
trains (Global News, 2014). Delays are longest for trains (usually freight trains) longer than 9,500 
feet (2.8 km). Freight trains can block more than one grade crossing simultaneously. This situation 
forces first responders and busy and/or impatient drivers to take long detours. 
In Saskatoon, there are tendencies to assume that blockages at level crossings contribute to 
only a small percentage of emergency response delays, but in reality, trains delay first responders 
on a weekly and daily basis. This situation is common in other North American cities and in various 
cities across the world (FRA, 2006). Delays caused by train blockages can have major 
consequences on the response time to an incident. For example, Tank (Star Phoenix, 2014) 
reported the outcome of a fire incident at a tire warehouse in February 2014, when first responders 
were blocked by a slow moving train in Sutherland, Saskatoon. The delay resulted in extensive 
damage. This situation took fire fighters from different fire districts, 15 consecutive hours with 32 
equivalent fire engines to resolve the fire due to delay in the response time by a blocked crossing. 
There may be examples of similar delays at grade crossings in many cities on other continents as 
well, but unfortunately this investigation was beyond the scope of this research. 
Grade separation provides a permanent solution to this problem but it requires massive 
construction, traffic delays during the construction period, and a great cost. Considering the many 
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at-grade crossings in Canada, grade separation cannot be justified as the most affordable and cost-
effective solution in most Canadian and North American jurisdiction (Easa et al., 1987).  
An alternative approach is a system that could provide real-time information on train 
movement and location. This system is known as “Grade Crossing Monitoring System (GCMS)”. 
A grade crossing monitoring system (GCMS) is a system designed to detect the presence of train, 
length of train, speed of train and the direction of the train. The monitoring system can also detect 
the times a crossing gate is closed through an interface of traffic preemption signal relays. The 
system aims at providing emergency dispatchers such as the Fire Department and other Emergency 
Services with a real-time train crossing blockage and positioning information system that will 
reduce emergency response time. With this information, emergency dispatchers will be aware of 
crossing times and gate closure times, which will help inform them on alternative routes to use to 
respond to emergencies quickly.  
In recent years, the design of a train crossing monitoring system for emergency dispatchers 
has been of much importance in transportation engineering. In 2001 and 2003, two similar projects 
were developed by Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) and Texas Transportation 
Institute (TTI). The Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) prototypes made use of two external train 
detection technologies coupled with CCTV to collect train traffic information. These technologies 
can collect other information such as speed, train travel direction, and train length, to provide real-
time information on grade crossings using automatic vehicle identification (AVI) transponders and 
Doppler radar devices. Goolsby et al., (2003) accomplished this by using a traffic signal cabinet 
with an interface of a signal preemption relay circuit, which was activated by the railroad’s 
equipment controlling the active crossing protection systems (gates and flashers) at the grade 
crossing.  Monitoring of the warning systems provided a positive indication of train presence at 
grade crossings to supplement train detection/projection data provided by the detection devices. 
(Ruback and Balke, 2001). The Doppler radar detector installation at a grade crossing and railway 
crossing status information display are shown in Figures 1-3 and 1-4. 
A conceptualized framework was carried out by Cisco, which uses wireless communication 
network system made up of IP networks, routers, switches, and surveillance cameras to help inform 
emergency response and public safety vehicles in emergency situations. The system aims to use 
GPS to guide emergency responders to emergency situations and also inform them on train 
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locations with a help of wireless communication signal to transmit information on train movement 
(www.cisco.com).  
Goolsby et al., (2004) and FRA (2006) investigated the impact of grade crossing blockages 
on first responders and suggested that GCMS would be beneficial, but both studies relied mainly 
on surveys of first responders and neither undertook any rigorous response time analysis of the 
issues. This research will develop emergency response time analysis to determine the potential 
impact grade crossing blockages and the benefit of installing a grade crossing monitoring system 
for first responders. 
  
 
Figure 1-3. Doppler Rader Detector and Installation of Grade Crossing Monitoring 
System. Source: (ITS Canada, 2014) 
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Figure 1-4. Railway Crossing Status Display from a Grade Crossing Monitoring System. 
Source: (ITS Canada, 2014) 
 
The second factor that influences emergency response time is fire equipment allocation. A 
Fire Department usually responds to all fire related incidents with a standard fire engine at least 
one of which is located in each fire district. In other special fire incidents, the Fire Department 
respond with specific types of fire engines which are not located in all the fire districts. The 
location of fire districts equipped with fire engines that have special features for specific types of 
incidents is therefore the foundation for efficient fire service delivery in emergency response. 
Different types of fire equipment are used in emergency response; examples include; engines, 
ladders, tankers, brush, decontamination, rescue boats, etc.  
These different types of equipment perform different functions during fire fighting. For 
example, the City of Saskatoon Fire Department responds to a fire incident in a high-rise building 
with a “Ladder-equipped” engine. This engine carries a ladder device to rescue people and fight 
fire. If there is a fire incident in an industry that generates toxic, caustic, pollutant, or unhealthful 
or damaging substances, a “decontamination” engine is used to control the harmful emissions. The 
location of these different types of fire equipment has an effect on emergency response time. It is 
clearly important to have a well-organized allocation of the different types of specialized 
equipment in the city.  
There are periods when the demand for a special type of fire engine in a new developing 
neighborhood may rise, and will therefore require additional fire protection support. A 
neighborhood with previous history of a high level of incidents may experience low records of fire 
incidents over a period of time. The fire district may require a new or special fire engine that has 
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special features to respond rapidly to emergencies (Rider, 1974). This research presents 
Saskatoon’s Fire Department emergency response fire equipment and a visualization of fire district 
response time to an incident considering all fire stations equipped with special fire engines. 
The third factor that affects emergency response time is the risk in occurrence of multiple 
incidents in a fire district which require pre-emptive reallocation of a fire engine. Multiple 
emergency situations (e.g., multiple 911 calls) in one or more fire districts are not uncommon. In 
Saskatoon there were 2,904 (13%) multiple incidents that occurred within 30minutes during the 
study period. Figure 1-5 shows a steady trend of approximately 500 multiple incidents per year 
from 2010 to 2013.  
 
Figure 1-5. Total Number of Multiple Incidents by Year 
 
Figure 1-6 shows Saskatoon’s fire stations (shown as FS #1 to FS #9) and the number of 
fire engines allocated to each fire station in 2013. FS #9, for instance, is located on the east side of 
Saskatoon and responds to fire related incidents occurring in an area of 58.8 square kilometers (see 
Figure 1-6); it normally experiences multiple 911 calls. When Saskatoon Fire Services dispatches 
a secondary fire engine from FS #2 or FS #8 to resolve multiple emergency situations in fire district 
#9, fire districts #2 and #8 maybe adversely affected by multiple emergency situation arising in 
their own fire district. This usually affects the response time to these incidents. 
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Ideally, each fire station would have multiple fire engines and the number of fire fighters 
needed to operate the fire engines, but budget restrictions limit six of the fire stations to a primary 
fire engine only. FS #1 has three fire engines because it serves the high density downtown area. 
The many high-rise buildings of downtown in Saskatoon generate a much higher number of calls 
for service, particularly during the daytime, than do the other fire districts. It is therefore difficult 
to reallocate FS #1’s fire engines to other fire districts as backup. The only other fire stations with 
more than one fire engine is FS #2, FS #8 has a standard engine and a ladder equipped engine 
which can also perform duties of a standard engine. These fire engines in FS #2 and FS #8 are 
available for dispatch to other fire districts when needed.   
For example, two distinct fire incidents (Dunlop Street and Central Avenue) occurred in 
fire district #9 on June 6, 2013. These incidents required a secondary fire engine to be dispatched 
from FS #2 to Central Avenue in fire district #9. While the secondary engine was operating in fire 
district #9, two separate incidents occurred in fire district #2 (Diefenbaker Drive and Maxwell 
Crescent). These incidents also required a secondary fire engine (Saskatoon Fire Department, 
2014).  
The potential occurrence of multiple incidents in more than one fire district makes it very 
important for the Saskatoon Fire Department to a) predict the time periods during which a 
particular fire district may require an additional fire engine, and b) ensure that multiple incidents 
do not adversely affect fire services of other fire districts. Since it is not financially feasible to 
purchase a secondary fire engine for all nine fire stations, the next best possible approach is to 
share the existing secondary fire engines stored in FS #2 and FS #8 as efficiently as possible when 
multiple incidents occur in one or more fire districts.   
To provide a high quality fire service, a fire department must provide the appropriate type 
of fire engines and the appropriate number of fire fighters to every incident within the department’s 
fire district. The International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) developed an operational 
standard for most countries in North America and Europe in 2002. This standard is known as the 
National Fire Protection Association 1710 (NFPA 1710). It highlighted the important functions of 
fire department emergency services and specified the response capabilities and resources, response 
times, levels of service, etc. required to maximally save both the lives of residents and fire fighters 
themselves.  
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NFPA 1710 also strongly encouraged fire departments to analyze and evaluate the number 
and type of fire incidents occurring at the various locations within a fire district (high-rise 
buildings, manufacturing companies, schools, hospitals, etc.), and ensure that additional fire 
engines and/or  fire fighters were available to fire districts that needed additional resources to avoid 
delays in emergency response. This kind of incident evaluation and forward planning is 
particularly important when multiple fire incidents occur concurrently. This research aims at using 
a pre-emptive reallocation method in allocating fire engines during multiple incidents in a 
particular fire district.  
Pre-emptive reallocation of a fire engine refers to the systematic reallocation of a secondary 
fire engine and its associated fire fighters in a way that temporarily transfers the services of the 
secondary fire engine from its original fire district to another fire district when a high number of 
service calls is expected in another fire district. Fire engine pre-emptive reallocation is designed 
to strengthen overall fire services in a region as it uses existing fire service resources more 
efficiently. The database of all reported incidents from 2009 to 2013 were analysed to develop a 
model to determine the period of risk of multiple incidents occurring in a fire district and the period 
for pre-emptive allocation of a fire engine to multiple incidents risk locations.  
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Figure 1-6. Saskatoon Fire Services' Response Districts and Number of Fire Engines 
 
1.2.   The Study Area 
The City of Saskatoon is located in the province of Saskatchewan, Canada. Saskatoon Fire 
Department has nine fire stations that serve nine fire districts. The fire districts are divided into 
four divisions, North, Central, East and West. These fire districts serve as a community-based 
protection service and provide emergency response to an estimated population of 304,975 within 
an area of 218 square kilometers. Saskatoon has two major rail hubs that provide rail services in 
the city, Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and Canadian National Railway (CNR). CPR was the 
first rail service in Saskatoon established in the late 1880s, and with the continuous demand for 
freight trains, CNR soon also added its services in Saskatoon.  
 
The rail system handles mainly agricultural produce (wheat), mining (coal, sulfur, potash, 
oil) and industrial products. The agricultural produce are distributed nationally to the west through 
Alberta, to the east through Manitoba and internationally through Montana and North Dakota 
(Landry, 1990.; MacKay, 1992). The existence of these two large rail yard tracks in the city has 
contributed to a large number of grade crossings across the city. There are currently 58 at grade 
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crossings on the three mainline railway routes that pass through the city. Figure 1-7 shows 
Saskatoon’s major railways routes, fire stations and fire response districts.  
 
 
Figure 1-7. Saskatoon's Railway Routes, Grade Crossings, and Fire Stations' Response 
Districts 
 
The Saskatoon Fire Department has 13 front line engines, two aerials (ladders), one heavy 
rescue truck, two tankers, two brush units, auxiliary trucks, specialty trailers, a command bus, a 
rigid hull jet boat and two inflatable boats. The fire department also has three reserve pumpers 
and one reserve aerial (ladder). There are 260 fire fighters and officer’s staff in the nine fire 
districts. These fire fighters respond to fire emergencies and are also trained in special rescue 
operations. All fire districts have one primary engine except districts #1, #2 and #8. Fire district 
#1 has three fire engines and since it serves the downtown and central part of the city, it is usually 
difficult to reallocate one of its engines as a secondary fire engines to other locations. For this 
reason, fire districts #2 and #8 dispatch one of their engines as a secondary engine to other locations 
during multiple emergency calls in other locations (City of Saskatoon, 2014).  
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A brief description of some major fire equipment operated by the Saskatoon Fire Department are as 
follows: 
Engine: This equipment is located in every fire station. It is specially designed and equipped 
for fire attack. An engine usually carries three to four fire fighters and it is equipped with a pump, 
water hose and a water tank that can store about 500 to 600 gallons. A fire Engine can also be referred 
to as “Pumpers”. An engine also has the ability to supply fire retardant foam. 
Ladder: This is a fire engine that carries more than 100 feet articulating Sky-Arm aerial 
ladder device. A ladder engine can carry about 300 gallons of water. It is located in only two fire 
stations. Ladders are usually used to fight fires in high rise buildings and distant areas that cannot 
be easily accessed by the fire truck. 
Tanker: This equipment is a special type of fire equipment with the primary purpose of 
transporting large volumes of water to a fire location during firefighting operations. A tanker can 
transport about 3,000 gallons of water. It is located in only two fire stations. It is equipped with an 
on-board pumping system that is used to draw water into a tank from hydrants or other water 
sources. 
Trailer (USAR): This apparatus is known as the urban search and rescue (USAR) trailer. It 
is special equipment that is used to carry many different types of equipment, some of which is 
quite bulky and heavy for an emergency vehicle during an immense fire and rescue operation. It 
is equipped with various medical and fire protective accessories to provide immediate on-scene 
medical help to victims trapped in a major structural collapse, motor accidents, or natural disasters 
such as earthquakes and hurricanes.  
Brush: This is 4x4 truck equipment used to fight fires off-road, i.e., wild land or grass fires. 
It is located in only two fire stations. It is also known as a brush truck. 
Decontamination: This equipment is known as Decon. It is used for the purpose of 
decontamination in an event of industrial fire that generates toxic pollutant, or other unhealthful 
and damaging substances in the atmosphere. This apparatus is located in only fire district #9. 
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Hazmat: The hazmat apparatus unit is used to respond to Hazardous Materials. A hazmat 
unit is used to respond to incidents associated with chemicals and products spillage (eg, oil). The 
hazmat unit is located in only one fire station. 
 
1.3.   Research Goal 
The goal of this research is to improve first responders’ emergency response time by developing a 
response time analysis to demonstrate the impact of grade crossing blockage and the benefit of 
installing a Grade Crossing Monitoring System. This research goal also includes investigating the 
response area for locations of specialized fire engines and the possibility of fire engine preemptive 
reallocation for preset short-term periods when multiple fire incidents may be expected to occur 
in a certain fire district. 
 
1.4.   Objectives 
To achieve this research goal, four specific objectives were addressed: 
1. To establish how grade crossing blockage information available from a GCMS changes 
first responders’ response times and service area; 
2. To develop service area and response time analysis for fire stations with fire engines 
equipped with special features;  
3. To develop a statistical model that can predict the time window when there is a high risk 
of multiple fire incidents in a fire district that has only a primary fire engine. (Fire district 
#9 was used as a sample district); and 
4. To develop a statistical model to determine the time window when a fire district that has 
more than one fire engine can dispatch a secondary fire engine for the purpose of pre-
emptive reallocation. (Fire districts #2 and #8 were used as sample districts).  
 
1.5.   Benefit of Research 
This research demonstrates the serious impact of grade crossing blockages and the benefit of 
installing a grade crossing monitoring system to improve emergency response time for the 
Saskatoon fire department. It will also establish the need to provide and reallocate fire equipment 
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to fire districts with high risk of multiple incident occurrences that require fire engines with special 
features and preemptive allocation of fire engines from other districts. The outcomes of this 
research are expected to help decision makers and emergency response agencies to introduce 
GCMS and the provision of fire equipment to improve emergency response time to reduce loss of 
lives and property damage. 
 
1.6.   Scope 
This research was focused on the City of Saskatoon Fire Department. The study developed 
response time analysis using five-year incident data from the Saskatoon fire department from 2009 
and 2013. Geographic Information System (GIS) street map from the City of Saskatoon was used 
to display visually the impact of grade crossing blockage, the benefit of installing a GCMS and to 
show response time and service areas for high incident areas that require allocations of fire 
equipment. Survival data analysis was used to develop a set of statistical models designed to 
determine the possible time window for fire engine pre-emptive reallocation from FS #2 or FS #8 
to FS #9 to handle multiple fire incidents in fire district #9. 
 
1.7.   Layout of Thesis 
Chapter two presents literature review of existing research on first responders’ emergency 
response time analysis, fire equipment allocation and the use of response time to an event analysis 
to determine the risk in occurrence of incidents in order to provide pre-emptive allocation of a fire 
engine. Chapter three discusses the data used for the research and data integration. Chapter four 
discusses the methods used in carrying out the objectives of this research. Chapter five discusses 
the analysis results and interpretation. Chapter six presents the conclusions with major 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2:   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1.   Emergency Response Time 
First responders’ emergency response time (or travel time) has been considered by numerous 
research studies with various purposes and objectives. A complex mathematical model known as 
the “inverse square root laws” was used by Kolesar and Blum (1973) to describe the relationship 
between average response distance and average number of response units (e.g., fire stations) 
assigned to an area. This model was developed to help solve emergency management decision 
problems in a fire department. Another mathematical model was developed by Kolesar et al., 
(1975) to illustrate the relationship between fire engines’ response time and travel distance. 
Kolesar et al. (1975) showed very small difference in response time by time of day (i.e., peak hour 
and non-peak hours). Comparing the response time during peak hour and non-peak hours, the 
increase in response time was not as great as expected by Kolesar et al., (1975).  
The models developed by both research studies used response time data collected in New 
York City through field experiments. Both studies were used to help determine the optimal number 
and emergency response units’ locations in New York City. The study by Green and Kolesar 
(2004) examined how earlier studies in the 1970s, including the two Kolesar studies, have had a 
great impact on management science for emergency response units in an area. Over the years, there 
have been numerous follow-up studies using different approaches to investigate the maximum 
number and/or (re)location of emergency response units for a given area.  
In recent years, there have been few studies made by fire departments, using mathematical 
models to improve fire station location, allocation of equipment and response times, although 
earlier studies that used complex mathematical models (e.g., linear optimization) to investigate 
and enhance emergency response plan and policy decisions were successful. For example, a recent 
study in modelling the allocation of emergency vehicles considering secondary incidents used a 
system of integrated mathematical model to allocate emergency vehicles on freeways during a 
secondary incident regardless of the location of the incident. The analytical model by Park et al., 
(2015) was based on the probabilities of a primary and secondary incidents over a time period to 
plan on dispatching an emergency vehicle to a secondary incident. This means that emergency 
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vehicles will need to remain at the location of a resolved primary incident without returning to its 
original location in anticipation of the occurrence of a secondary incident.  
One reason that prevents fire officials and other decision makers from adopting 
mathematical models is the problem of understanding and applying the models (Green and 
Kolesar, 2004). Another reason may be the failure of the models to consider important real-world 
constraints. For example, a linear optimization model was developed by some researchers to 
allocate multiple dispatchers. This model was used to optimize the total response time of fire 
engines and the number of emergency locations that could be reached from a fire station within 
the four-minute journey time. (Yang et al., 2005; Aktas et al., 2013; Murry et al., 2013).  
Many of these mathematical models unfortunately did not clearly take into consideration 
other various factors that may be even more important to the fire department’s service tactics and 
strategies than the response time. These factors include the number of fire fighters and workload 
in each fire station, the spatial and temporal road network changes that affect traffic conditions on 
the road network, number and type of fire engines in each fire station, and the annual operational 
budget available to a fire department. A good example of spatial and temporal road network 
changes is blockages at grade crossings. Emergency response issues that are associated with train 
blockages pose a major challenge to researchers when using mathematical models. 
The difficulties associated with understanding and interpreting some of these complex 
mathematical models and the problems of including so many factors in a mathematical model has 
resulted in many fire departments turning to the visual display of output available from a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) for their decision making processes. Studies by Derekenaris 
et al., (2001) and Malowidzki et al., (2013) show conceptual frameworks that integrate 
GIS/GPS/GSM technologies to provide a decision support tool to enhance emergency response 
agencies’ dispatching routes.  
 
2.2.   Geographic Information System 
Geographic information system (GIS) can be defined as ….“a system of integrated data, software, 
and computer hardware for analyzing, managing, capturing, and displaying all forms of 
geographically referenced information to provide a proper interpretation and visualization of the 
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relationships and patterns in the form of maps and charts for useful purposes…” (ESRI, 2007). 
GIS is used to effectively manage and support emergency response operations by first responders. 
GIS techniques has been widely used in different analyses on emergency response. For 
example, the spatial relationship between various types of fire incident and selected socio-
economic, geographic and demographic data (e.g., property types, population dynamics, 
neighbourhood classification, etc.) was investigated using GIS spatial pattern analysis tool 
(Corcoran et al., 2013; Higgins et al., 2013). In recent years, a brief review of applications of GIS 
technologies to urban fire rescue management was carried out by Corcoran and Higgs (2013), but 
there are no studies found, to investigate the impact of spatial and temporal blockages on 
emergency response time and route selection using GIS techniques. 
There are some transportation engineering studies that have investigated the most efficient 
(shortest or fastest) response route to fire incidents or traffic accidents, using simulation tools, such 
as CORSIM or ARENA. For example, a simulation model was developed by Haghani et al. (2013) 
to determine a non-congested routes for emergency vehicles. This model uses a system strategy to 
assign emergency vehicles using travel time information. Another study used the COSSIM traffic 
simulation tool to model effective hurricane evacuation routes using traffic and road network 
information for emergency planning strategies (Haghani et al., 2013; Sisiopiku, 2007; Zhang et 
al., 2009; Zhou & Liu, 2011).  
There are merits in using simulation tools to search for the fastest/shortest response route 
to an incident considering the benefit of using traffic volume and traffic congestion information, 
but the size of the road network that can be simulated has been a major limitation. There are studies 
that have considered using a small and limited road network to determine the fastest/shortest route. 
The network in a study area, for example, might have restrictions on the arterials and freeways. 
The inclusion of every road segment and every intersection on a large road network remains a 
difficult technical challenge in a real city.  
Emergency preemption systems installed at level crossings are designed to give priority to 
approaching trains to prevent collision between trains and road vehicles. Based on an intelligent 
transportation system (ITS) (Nelson and Bullock, 2000; Mirchandani and Lucas, 2004), the main 
purpose of emergency preemption systems installed at level crossings are designed to give priority 
not to emergency vehicles, but to approaching trains. This approach is not useful in reducing 
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emergency responders’ response times. Specifically, preemption systems at grade crossings are 
not designed to reduce emergency response times nor to help with emergency vehicles routes. The 
use of GIS-based analysis offers a more straightforward approach and would be beneficial to the 
fire department to analyze the impact of spatial and temporal network restrictions on emergency 
response time and allocation of fire equipment. GIS-based analysis was used in this study. 
In theory, simulation tools are useful in emergency response analysis, but practically, they 
do not offer the great computing power required when analyzing the entire road network of a large 
city. Apart from the discussions on GCMS in the Introduction, there have been no existing ITS 
techniques that have proven effective in reducing first responders emergency response times 
considering blockages at level crossings. This research approach is unique and different from other 
studies. 
 
2.3.   Survival Data Analysis 
Survival analysis (a.k.a., time to event or time to failure analysis) has been successfully used in a 
many disciplines for various types of event including death, divorce and disease (Smith et al., 
2012, Williams, 2008., Anderson et al., 1991). The subject of survival analysis usually involves 
the time at which the target event occurs and/or the duration (length of time) between two 
successive target events. The length of time leading up to an event or the length of time between 
the two successive target events is known as the survival time. The usual time units in survival 
analysis are days, weeks, months or years. In survival analysis, the survival function (S(t)) and 
hazard functions (h(t)) are the two most important functions. 
Approaches to the development of survival and hazard functions include non-parametric 
and parametric models (Cleves et al., 2004, Klein et al., 2003). Survival analysis techniques that 
are widely used in transportation engineering were selected: the Kaplan-Meier survival probability 
estimator, often simply called the Kaplan-Meier estimator; and the Cox hazard model. The Kaplan-
Meier estimator, a non-parametric approach, was used to develop the survival function and the 
Cox hazard model was used to develop the hazard function.  
Both the Kaplan-Meier estimator and the Cox hazard model have been used in various 
interesting and recent studies. Shi et al. (2014), for example, conducted a survival data analysis in 
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which they investigated the duration of traffic incidents on an expressway in Shanghai, China. 
They used the Kaplan-Meier estimator to estimate and categorize the main factors that contribute 
to traffic incident duration. Possible factors included type of incident, time of day (day and night), 
location of incident, number of lanes, etc. To determine how such factors influence traffic incident 
duration, Shi et al. used the Cox hazard model.   
Masten and Foss (2010), for instance, used the Kepler Meier method, a non-parametric 
approach, to estimate survival probability. They defined survival probability as the probability of 
experiencing the first collision after obtaining one’s first driving license before and after the 
implementation of a graduated driver licensing program in North Carolina. Using this approach, 
they demonstrated that the implementation of graduated driver licensing system on young teen 
drivers in North Carolina was successful since the young drivers who took the program are 
expected to take longer time to experience the first collision.  
Masten and Foss (2010) used the Cox proportional hazard model to show the different 
collision risks of young drivers according to selected input variables such as age and gender. 
Xiaobao et al. (2012) also used the Cox proportional hazard model. They showed the impact of 
various traffic parameters (bus volume, passenger car volume, percentage of bicycles, etc.) on 
vehicles’ travel time between bus stops. They used the model outcomes to plan and design bus 
stop locations. There have been very few studies in the use of survival analysis by fire departments’ 
emergency response operations.  
In this research, the Kaplan-Meier test and the Cox proportional hazard model was used to 
develop a survival function and hazard function respectively. The study developed a set of 
statistical models to predict the specific time of the day, season of the year, and type of fire incident 
associated with a higher risk of multiple simultaneous incidents in a fire district to determine the 
possible time window for fire engine preemptive reallocation.  
 
2.4.   Chapter Summary 
The literature in this chapter reviews studies by researchers on emergency response time for first 
responders. The review by earlier studies shows the use of mathematical models to describe the 
relationship between the response time and travel distance using data from field experiments. Even 
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though fire departments made little use of these models, the outcomes were useful in (re)allocating 
fire engines to a given area.  
An alternative approach for fire departments to analyze emergency response time for fire 
engines without considering so many factors used in earlier mathematical models is a Geographic 
Information System (GIS). GIS provides a visual display of important information for fire 
departments to enhance emergency response delivery. 
The literature reviewed different survival data analysis study approach on how the Kepler 
Maier and cox proportional hazard model was used to determine the probability and risk involved 
in the occurrence of an event considering selected input variables. 
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CHAPTER 3:   STUDY DATA 
 
There were two types of data used to conduct this research: spatial data with road and railway 
network information from the City of Saskatoon and Incident data from the Saskatoon Fire 
Department.  
3.1.   Spatial Data 
The spatial data for the City of Saskatoon was made up of a geographic information system (GIS) 
that is used to visually display, analyse and manage the current road and railway network. Two 
ArcGIS shape files were obtained with detailed information on all existing road and railway 
network in the City. 
Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 show examples of the information from the road network and 
railway shape files provided by the City of Saskatoon. Table 3-1 shows road location identifiers 
(ROAD_ID), street location identifier (STREET_NAM), street position (STREET_POS), street 
name (ONLINE_STR), posted speed limit (SPEED_LIMI), number of lanes (LANE_COUNT), 
etc. Table 3-2 shows railway location identifiers (RL_ID), railway ownership (OWNER), rail type 
(RTE_TYPE), province (SK), rail position location code (CODE), railway feature (FEATURE), 
etc. 
 
Table 3-1. Saskatoon's ArcGIS Shape File Information on Road Network Segment            
(COS, 2014) 
ROAD 
_ID 
STREET 
_NAM 
STREET 
_POS 
ONLINE 
_STR 
SPEED 
_LIMI 
LANE 
_COUNT 
9203 T N Ave T N 50 2 
9206 23rd W 23rd St W 50 2 
6576 S S Ave S S 50 2 
6579 21st W 21st St W 50 2 
6586 R S Ave R S 50 2 
6587 Q S Ave Q S 50 2 
6618 P S Ave P S 50 2 
6570 20th W 20th St W 50 4 
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Table 3-2. Saskatoon's ArcGIS Shape File Information on Railway Segment (COS, 2014) 
RL_ID OWNER RTE_TYPE PROV CODE FEATURE 
61568 CN RL SK 962 MAIN LINE 
16630 CN RL SK 962 MAIN LINE 
20105 Sidetrack RL SK 963 SIDETRACK 
20185 Sidetrack RL SK 963 SIDETRACK 
61548 CN RL SK 91 MAIN LINE - BRIDGE 
2711 CPR RL SK 962 MAIN LINE 
2410 CPR RL SK 962 MAIN LINE 
61559 CPR RL SK 91 MAIN LINE - BRIDGE 
 
 
3.2.   Incident Data 
Incident data for the study was provided by the Saskatoon Fire Department. The database involves 
two separate tables – Reported Incident location (INCIDENTS) table and Response 
(APPARATUSRESPONDING) table. The INCIDENT table includes information (e.g., incident 
begin time, incident end time, type of incident, location of incident, etc.) on all reported emergency 
calls that were responded to by the fire department. The APPARATUSRESPONDING table 
includes information (e.g., apparatus name, dispatch time, on route time, on scene time etc.) on all 
reported emergency calls responded by the fire department.  
The department responded to a total of 22,618 incidents from 2009 to 2013. Figure 3-8 
shows a map of the frequency of incidents from 2009 to 2013. The frequency levels shown in the 
map legend are described as: low, this represents the average or below average number of 
incidents; medium, this represent above average and four times the average number of incident and 
high, this represent more than four times the average number of incidents. There were high number 
of incidents recorded in the central Saskatoon downtown area. The types of incidents the fire 
department responded were, Alarm, Fire and Dangerous goods incidents. Figures 3-9a, 3-9b and 
3-9c shows maps of the frequency of incidents reported as alarm, fire and dangerous good. Fire 
district #1 shows high number of incident frequency.  
The classification of these incident types were based on the nature of the incident and the 
type of fire equipment used to respond to these incidents. For example, an incident referred to as 
Alarm (Level 1) is responded with two pump engines, rapid intervention team (RIT) and a ladder 
equipped engine. An incident referred to as Dangerous goods (DG 1A) is responded with a district 
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engine and a Hazmat with trailer on standby. An incident referred to as Fire (Fire 1+) is responded 
with a district engine and an extra pump.  
 
 
Figure 3-8. Map Showing Total Number of Incidents 
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(b)  
 
(c)  
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(d) 
Figure 3-9. Maps Showing Incidents Reported as (a) Alarm (b) Fire (c) Dangerous Goods 
 
 
   Table 3-3 shows an example of the information in the INCIDENT table, it includes 
incident identification number (Incident Number (NFIRS)), incident begin time (INCIDENT 
BEGIN TIME), incident end time (INCIDENT END TIME), location of incident (ADDRESS 
DISPLAY), type of incident, (INCIDENT TYPE DESCRIPTION), etc. 
Table 3-4 shows an example of information in the APPARATUSRESPONDING table, it 
includes incident identification number (Incident Number (NFIRS)), response equipment name 
(APPARATUS NAME), dispatch time (DISPATCH TIME), on route time (ON ROUTE TIME), 
on scene time (ON SCENE TIME), etc. 
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Table 3-3.  Incident Location Table (SFD, 2014) 
INCIDENT  
NUMBER 
(NFIRS) 
INCIDENT 
BEGIN  
TIME 
INCIDENT  
END  
TIME 
ADDRESS  
DISPLAY 
INCIDENT 
TYPE  
DESCRIPTION 
10-13321 12/16/2010 18:19 12/16/2010 18:32 1608 8TH ST E DG LEVEL 1A 
09-11965 10/31/2009 16:08 10/31/2009 16:29 803 AVE L N DG LEVEL 1B 
09-11765 10/26/2009 6:48 10/26/2009 7:00 1840 ONT AVE FIRE LEVEL 1 
13-11061 8/24/2013 1:09 8/26/2013 14:43 809 50TH ST E FIRE LEVEL 2 
10-13169 12/11/2010 7:15 12/11/2010 7:34 241 5TH AVE N ALARM  
 
Table 3-4. Response Equipment (APPARATUSRESPONDING) table (SFD, 2014) 
INCIDENT 
NUMBER  
(NFIRS) 
APPARATUS  
NAME 
DISPATCH  
TIME 
ON ROUTE  
TIME 
ON SCENE  
TIME 
10-13321 Engine 03 12/16/2010 18:22 12/16/2010 18:24 12/16/2010 18:29 
11-06764 Engine 04 7/3/2011 11:42 7/3/2011 11:44 7/3/2011 11:51 
11-06765 Engine 11 7/3/2011 12:11 7/3/2011 12:12 7/3/2011 12:31 
12-05920 Engine 03 5/7/2012 19:49 5/7/2012 19:50 5/7/2012 20:04 
12-05921 Engine 01 5/7/2012 20:09 5/7/2012 20:10 5/7/2012 20:24 
 
3.3.   Data Integration 
The spatial and incident databases were processed and revised for the analysis. The spatial data 
with information on the road and railway network were modified to identify all the intersection of 
road and railway in Saskatoon. Table 3-5 shows an example of the information in the road and 
railway intersection table. It includes railway ownership (OWNER), rail position location code 
(CODE), railway location identifiers (RL_ID), road location identifiers (ROAD_ID), street name 
(ONLINE_STR), etc. 
The road network attribute table was also modified to be capable of being used for the 
ArcGIS network and service area time-based analysis. The ArcGIS field calculator tool was used 
to add the fields; LENGTH (kilometers), TIME (minutes) and TIME_80 (minutes). These fields 
were very vital in determining the time and distance covered for every network route and service 
area covered.  
 Incident databases/tables (INCIDENT and APPARATUS RESPONDING) needed to be 
integrated together to generate a single database. Quality control was performed on each database 
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to ensure that there were no duplicates incidents recorded using Microsoft Excel Pivot Table tool. 
ArcGIS join table tool was used to merge the two Incident databases/tables to generate the 
integrated database. The integrated database was used to determine the total number of incident 
responded by the Saskatoon Fire Department. Based on the integrated database, additional 
columns were created to add lacking data (day of week, hour, month, season, year, duration of 
incident, response time, journey time, type of incident and response equipment classification) 
needed to create histograms to describe the trend of the incident data.  
The classification of the incident types and response equipment were based on the fire 
department’s response configuration manual. This manual serves as a guideline in identifying the 
type incident they are responding to and also the appropriate equipment and personnel to be 
dispatched. Table 3-6 and 3-7 shows an example of the information from the integrated database 
that represent the “Total Number of Incidents” with response equipment.  
Table 3-5. Intersection of Road and Railway table (COS, 2014) 
OWNER CODE RL_ID ROAD_ID ONLINE_STR 
CPR 962 61564 869905 Preston Ave N 
CPR 962 2411 18528 Central Ave 
CPR 962 2488 872370 Idylwyld Dr N 
CPR 962 2488 903835 22nd St W 
CPR 962 2488 7304 Ave C N 
CN 962 2537 997637 11th St W 
CN 962 2538 997547 Dundonald Ave 
CN 962 2406 891224 33rd St E 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3
0
 
 
 
 
INCIDENT
NUMBER(NFI
RS)
INCIDENT
BEGIN 
TIME
INCIDENT
END TIME
YEAR MONTH SEASON DAYofWEEK HOUR SREET DURATION
(min)
STATION# INCIDENT
Type
JOURNEY
TIME (min)
RESPONSE
TIME (min)
09-00099 1/4/2009 11:03 1/4/2009 11:18 2009 January Winter Sunday 12 1ST AVE S 15 1 ALARM 3 5
10-00072 1/2/2010 21:39 1/2/2010 22:16 2010 January Winter Saturday 23 22ND STW 37 1 FIRE 6 8
12-01614 2/8/2012 16:53 2/8/2012 17:20 2012 February Winter Wednesday 18 COLLEGE DR 27 5 ALARM 10 11
13-00275 1/8/2013 12:59 1/8/2013 13:20 2013 April Winter Tuesday 14 COLLEGE DR 21 5 DANGEROUSGOODS 5 6
09-00137 1/5/2009 18:31 1/5/2009 18:48 2009 January Winter Monday 19 33RD STW 17 2 ALARM 7 8
09-00237 1/8/2009 16:31 1/8/2009 16:33 2009 January Winter Thursday 17 37TH STW 2 4 DANGEROUSGOODS 1 2
11-00188 1/6/2011 22:24 1/6/2011 22:50 2011 January Winter Thursday 23 104STW 26 5 FIRE 10 12
09-01159 2/13/2009 18:41 2/20/2009 10:51 2009 February Winter Friday 11 SAGUENAY DR 250 7 FIRE 10 732
Table 3-6. Integrated Total Incident Number of Incident table (SFD, 2014)
INCIDENT
NUMBER(NFIRS)
INCIDENT
BEGIN TIME
INCIDENT
END TIME
YEAR MONTH SEASON DAYofWEEK HOUR SREET DURATION
(min)
INCIDENT
Type
RESPONSE
EQUIPMENT
09-01206 2/15/2009 15:58 2/15/2009 16:27 2009 February Winter Sunday 17 AVE M S 29 DANGEROUSGOODS HAZMAT
09-01835 3/8/2009 23:21 3/8/2009 23:54 2009 March Spring Sunday 24 AVE I S 43 DANGEROUSGOODS HAZMAT
11-00188 1/6/2011 22:24 1/6/2011 22:50 2011 January Winter Thursday 23 104ST STW 26 FIRE TANKER
13-00535 1/15/2013 21:03 1/15/2013 21:17 2013 January Winter Tuesday 22 COLLEGE DR 14 ALARM LADDER
13-00539 1/16/2013 01:53 1/16/2013 02:03 2013 February Winter Wednesday 3 CAMPUS DR 10 ALARM LADDER
09-08984 8/16/2009 05:09 8/16/2009 05:34 2009 August Summer Sunday 6 22ND STW 25 DANGEROUSGOODS DECON
13-09700 7/30/2013 11:44 7/30/2013 11:47 2013 July Summer Tuesday 12 106TH STW 3 FIRE BRUSH
13-09736 7/30/2013 19:05 7/30/2013 19:13 2013 July Summer Tuesday 20 CENTRAL AVE 8 FIRE BRUSH
Table 3-7. Integrated Total Incident Number of Incident table and Response Equipment (SFD, 2014)
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3.4.   Chapter Summary 
This chapter contains the different types of data received from the City of Saskatoon and the fire 
department. The chapter also includes the data management processes on the data. The data for the 
research was made up of a spatial data and incident data. The spatial data contains geographic 
information on the road and railway network in Saskatoon. These spatial data were shape files 
with detailed information on all existing road and railway network. The road and railway network 
data was modified to identify all the grade crossings in Saskatoon. This was very useful for the 
GIS-based analyses.  
The incident data was made up of two tables with information on all reported incidents and 
the types of equipment that were used to respond to each incident. A total of 22,618 incidents were 
recorded by the fire department from 2009 to 2013. The types of incidents responded to by the 
department are incidents associated with alarm, fire and dangerous goods. The two tables were 
integrated into one database using ArcGIS join table tool. The integrated data was imported into 
ArcGIS to visually display the total incidents and types of fire related incidents on the map.  R-
Language was used to create histogram charts to describe the trend and nature of the incident data. 
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CHAPTER 4:   METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1.   GIS-Based Data Analysis 
To determine the impact of grade crossing blockages and the allocation of fire equipment on 
emergency response time, two ArcGIS-based spatial data analysis tools were used. These spatial 
data analysis tool are both similar and quantitative but distinct in how the results are visually 
displayed. The analyses were:  
▪ Service area analysis; and  
▪ Network analysis 
The service area analysis (SAA) was used to investigate the impact of a grade crossing 
blockage on the service area in a fire district and to determine the response area of fire stations 
equipped with fire engines with special features. The response area covered within a fire district 
and the changes in service area, with/without grade crossing blockage was determined using a fire 
station’s service area. The network analysis (NA) was then used to investigate the network route 
when there was no train blockage at grade crossings (i.e., default circumstance). The network 
analysis was used to compare two situations where dispatchers may assume that a route is blocked 
but it is actually open (without GCMS) and where dispatchers know (with GCMS) that there is a 
blocked crossing and can plan their route accordingly. The NA was used to compare route(s) 
available to dispatchers with/without GCMS when multiple grade crossings are blocked 
simultaneously by a train.  
 
4.1.1.   Service Area Analysis 
The Service Area (SA) is an ArcGIS Network Analyst. In this study SAA was defined as…“a type 
of network analysis for determining the region that encompasses all accessible streets - streets 
that lie within a specified impedance (e.g., time or distance)...” (Gomersall, 2003). The Service 
Area (SA) can be described as the geographic area in which an expected level of service is provided 
and fulfilled. (Indriasaria et al., 2010; Murray & O’Kelly, 2002). When determining a fire station’s 
SA, the time taken to reach an incident is considered rather than the physical distance covered. In 
this study, the accessibility of streets was measured in terms of time. For example, a four-minute 
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SA for a fire station on a network includes all the roadways and buildings that can be reached 
within four minutes from that fire station. This study used ArcGIS SAA algorithm known as 
Dijkstra's algorithm to determine a SA using the shortest path (Dijkstra, 1959). 
GIS-based SAA is used widely used in transportation engineering, especially in public 
transit studies to determine the walking distance to/from public transit stations (e.g., to/from light 
rail stations in downtown Sacramento, CA (Upchurch et al., 2004) and to/from metro stations in 
Minneapolis–Saint Paul, MN (Lee et al., 2013)). There are numerous studies that have used SAA 
to determine the response area of fire stations (Lee et al., 2013; Forkuo and Quaye-Ballard, 2013; 
ESRI, 2007). SAA has been used in some studies to determine the location of a number of fire 
stations in a large study area in the possible future. These studies seek to maximize the area of 
coverage as efficiently as possible (Indriasaria et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2006).  
 
4.1.2.   Network Analysis 
GIS-based NA is an ArcGIS Network Analyst tool designed to find the fastest route on a road 
network from one or multiple origins (fire stations) to one or multiple destinations (incidents). In 
NA, all the possible routes to an incident are considered to determine the fastest and most efficient 
route(s) available to one or more fire stations. There are previous studies that have used Dijkstra's 
algorithm to find the fastest route on a road network to an incident for different emergency service 
agencies (Forkuo and Quaye-Ballard, 2013; Kai et al., 2014). 
The analysis in this study assumed travel speed of fire engines which is a very essential 
factor in the network routes. In a study analysis of an area near the University at Buffalo North 
Campus, NY, Henchey et al., (2014) it was assumed that emergency vehicles (EMS vehicles) 
travel 10 mph faster than the posted speed limit. A micro-simulation tool known as Rockwell 
ARENA was used for the study analysis. A study by Holm et al. (2007) proposed the “10 mph 
rule” and designed a micro-simulation tool (the CORSIM model) to investigate the impact on 
traffic flow on a road network, emergency vehicles and regular cars by different travel speed. The 
“10 mph rule” proposed by Henchey et al. (2014) and Holm et al. (2007) for EMS vehicles was 
not adequately justified. 
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The Saskatoon Fire Department assumes that fire engines travel at 80% of the posted speed 
limit when planning or considering emergency policy decisions. The choice of the speed takes into 
account real world travel conditions of reaching an incident: slowing down on roadways with 
different geometric and environmental restrictions (e.g., roundabouts), slowing down to avoid 
collision with conflicting vehicles, cyclists and/or pedestrians right-of-way, making turns at 
signalized/unsignalized intersections. The speed is also based mainly on dispatchers’ knowledge 
of response times in Saskatoon and long years of experience. In this study analysis, the assumption 
that fire engines travel at 80% of posted speed limits was used. This approach is more applicable 
in the study area than the “10 mph rule”. 
The potential for delay due to traffic congestion is very limited in Saskatoon and it is worth 
noting that dispatchers are not subject to the kind of recurrent traffic congestion which is typical 
of large cities. For this reason, this study was not focused on delays caused by traffic congestion 
but an unexpected event such as a grade crossing blockage and the availability of fire equipment 
when finding the fastest and shortest route to an incident.  
The Fire Department takes into account several factors before responding to an emergency 
in a fire district. These factors were considered to determine the impact of grade crossing blockages 
and the allocation of fire equipment with special functionality on emergency response time. These 
factors includes the type of incident (eg., fire alarm, oil spill, vehicle collision, etc), the location of 
the incident (high-rise building, wild grass fire, industrial, etc), the type of fire engine required and 
the availability of fire engines due to other secondary incidents. The Fire Department responds to 
every incident with a different approach depending on the circumstances. For example, in the case 
of an intense fire in a high-rise building, two to four fire engines are dispatched simultaneously 
with a ladder equipped engine regardless of the response districts. The following assumptions and 
decisions were made in carrying out this analysis: 
1. The response area analysis of fire equipment allocation was based mainly on fire districts 
that have fire engines equipped with special features such as Ladder, Hazmat, Tanker, etc. 
These fire engines are not located in all fire districts, therefore the SFD usually dispatches 
these special fire engines to other fire districts during an emergency situation that requires 
these special fire engines. 
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2. The study analysis was limited to incidents within the response district of a fire station, as 
a majority of incidents occurs within the response district and this provide a valuable basis 
for analysis. 
 
3. The analysis of response times assumed that the SFD’s response team dispatches fire 
engines from the nearest fire station, but in reality, the type of fire engine dispatched to an 
incident is dependent on the type of incident. For example, in Saskatoon, dispatchers 
respond to a fire incident in an industry that generates toxic, unhealthful or damaging 
substance, with a “decontamination” fire engine to control the harmful emissions, which is 
located in FS #9. This means that, there are situations where fire engines dispatched to an 
incident location may not be directly dispatched from the nearest fire station.  
 
4. The incidents used in the analysis to test the impact of blocked grade crossings were 
assumed to be normal emergencies not requiring many fire engines from different fire 
stations. 
 
5. This research did not use any field work to collect data on actual response times and 
dispatch routes, although some research has been based on the field collection of actual 
response times and dispatch routes (Kolesar and Blum, 1973; Kolesar et al., 1975). The 
study did not consider concerns of the possibility of an unforeseen adverse consequence 
(e.g., a road accident). Instead, the study adopted the most recent approaches, using GIS 
techniques, and assumed dispatch routes and travel speeds. 
 
6. The Saskatoon Fire Department does not keep records of their travel route and distance 
traveled to incidents, as is the case in New Zealand (Claridge and Spearpoint, 2013). A 
secure radio communication system is used by fire fighters driving to an incident to 
communicate with 911 call dispatchers to ensure that both sides can be up-to-date with any 
unforeseen changes in route that arise due to unexpected roadway events such as level 
crossing blockages, construction work zones, traffic accidents, roadways covered in snow, 
etc. These unforeseen delays in routes puts fire fighters in a difficult position to report the 
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increase in total response time accurately and quantitatively. For this reason, it was not 
appropriate to use response times reported by the Fire Department for a scientific analysis.  
 
7. Two different situations were analyzed in Saskatoon to test the impact of blocked crossings 
on response time and the benefit of GCMS. Montgomery area is notable for blockages due 
to stationary trains, while Downtown Saskatoon normally experiences blockages due to 
slow moving trains. GCMS can be used to calculate the speed of trains and duration at each 
crossing due to a slow moving train. This additional information can be used to refine the 
choice of dispatch route. 
 
4.2.   Survival Data Analysis 
Survival data analysis was used to develop simple statistical models that can predict the time 
window when there is a high risk of multiple fire incidents in a fire district that has only a primary 
fire engine, and when a fire district that has more than one fire engine can dispatch a secondary 
fire engine for the purpose of pre-emptive reallocation.   
The survival time in this study is defined as the time between two successive incidents that 
occur in a single fire district within an hour. The study’s unit for time analysis is minutes. This is 
because every minute in an emergency is crucial to saving lives. 
In this study, the Kaplan-Meier test and the Cox proportional hazard model was used to 
develop the survival function and hazard function, respectively. The SAS Ver.9.4 was used to 
develop all the statistical models for the survival analysis. 
Fire district #2 and fire district #8 were our supplier fire districts as they were the only fire 
districts with a secondary fire engine. We selected fire district #9 as our demand fire district. These 
three Saskatoon fire districts together recorded 6,571 incidents during the study period, 29% of the 
total for Saskatoon. In the case of the supplier fire districts, fire district # 2 had 5,237 incidents 
with 1,208 of these incidents defined as multiple incidents (23% of the district’s total) and fire 
district #8 had 271 incidents (23 multiple incidents (8%). The demand fire district, fire district #9, 
had 1,063 incidents (141 multiple incidents (13%).  
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4.2.1.   Kaplan-Meier Estimator 
The Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator is a nonparametric estimate of the survival function S(t), which 
is used to indicate the probability of surviving up to a certain time t (i.e., survival time). Suppose 
there are a set of events with unique time interval which can be interpreted as the observed survival 
times, t1,…., tk ,where k is the number of distinct events under observation (an event is defined as 
the time interval between two successive incidents), nj presents the number of chances that an event  
may be experienced up to a given time period tj , and dj is the number of occurrences of events 
experience during that period of time tj , then the KM estimate at any given time t is given as; 
                            
                                                       ?̂?(𝑡) = ∏ [1 −
𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
]𝑗:𝑡,𝑗≤𝑡                                       Equation    [4-1] 
As there is no event occurrence at t = 0, the Kaplan-Meier estimator is typically presented 
in the form of a step function that starts at 1 (100% chance of survival). The estimator then 
decreases as more and more events occur. In summary, the Kaplan-Meier estimator is an estimate 
of survival probability as a function of time (Efron, 1988).  
The Kaplan-Meier estimator was used to provide an indication of the time periods when 
fire district #9 was most likely to experience multiple incidents and therefore need assistance from 
fire district #2 and/or fire district #8. Three time periods were considered as input variables: 1) 
time of the day (two categories were compared, peak hours (10 am to 11 pm) and non-peak hours 
(11 pm to 10 am)); 2) season of the year (four categories were compared, spring, summer, fall, and 
winter); and 3) day of the week (two categories were compared, weekdays with weekends).  
The Log-Rank and Wilcoxon tests were used to decide whether the differences shown in 
the Kaplan-Meier estimator’s results for the different time periods and different type of incident 
were significant at the 95% confidence level. Three goodness of fit tests were used: the likelihood 
ratio test, the score test and the Wald test (Lee and Wang, 2003). The 95% confidence level was 
used in all our analyses. 
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4.2.2.   Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimation 
The Cox hazards model shows the statistical relationship between the various input variables xi 
(e.g., season of the year and type of incident) and the survival time between multiple incidents. 
The hazards models are developed to represent the risk of occurrence of multiple incidents in a 
particular fire district. The hazard at a period of time ti is defined as: 
                   ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)×𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖2 + ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑘}                        Equation    [4-2] 
Taking natural logarithms of both sides: 
                  ln {
ℎ𝑖(𝑡)
ℎ0(𝑡)
} =  𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖2 +  ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑘                                        Equation    [4-3]           
where, hi (t) is the hazard at a given period of time ti, h0 (t) is the baseline hazard, and 𝛽𝑖 is the risk 
of multiple incidents occurring in a fire district. 𝛽 is also used to obtain the hazard ratios. If 𝛽i = 
0, the input variable xi has no statistically significant relationship with the occurrence of multiple 
incidents in the subject fire district. If 𝛽i ≠ 0, the input variable xi has a statistically significant 
relationship with the occurrence of multiple incidents.  
If 𝛽𝑖 is positive, the risk of an event occurrence due to the associated input variables is 
high. If 𝛽𝑖 is negative, the risk of an event occurrence due to the associated input variables is low. 
The hazard ratio is the exponential of 𝛽𝑖 and is defined as the relative hazard corresponding to a 
unit change in the associated input variables. As a result, if the hazard ratio of an input variable is 
less than 1, the input variable has little influence on the risk an event occurrence, but if the hazard 
ratio of an input variable is greater than 1, the input variable has considerable influence on the risk 
of event an occurrence (Xiaobao et al., 2012).  
In this study, three separate Cox hazards models were developed to estimate the risk of 
multiple incidents, one model for the demand fire district (fire district #9) and one model for each 
of the two supplier fire districts (fire districts #2 and #8).  
 
4.3.   Chapter Summary 
To achieve the objectives of this research, two ArcGIS-based spatial data analyses tools were used. 
The tools were used to determine the impact of grade crossing blockages and the allocation of fire 
equipment on emergency response time. Two survival data analyses technique were used to 
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develop models that can predict the time window when there is a high risk of multiple fire incidents 
in a fire district that has only a primary fire engine. The data analyses tools were also used to 
ascertain when a fire district that has more than one fire engine can dispatch a secondary fire engine 
for the purpose of pre-emptive reallocation.   
The two ArcGIS-based spatial data analyses were used to test the impact of GCMS on 
emergency response time for blockages due to stationary trains in Montgomery and slow moving 
trains in Saskatoon Downtown. These spatial analyses are service area analysis (SAA) and 
Network analysis (NA). The service area analysis was used to investigate the changes in a fire 
station’s service area with or without a grade crossing blockage. The service area was used to 
develop four-minute response time service area for fire station’s equipped with special features. 
The network analysis (NA) was used to investigate the network route taken by dispatchers when 
there is train blockage and no blockage at grade crossings with GCMS) and without GCMS. The 
network analysis was used to demonstrate the benefit of installing a grade crossing monitoring 
system to improve emergency response time. 
The Kaplan-Meier test and the Cox proportional hazard model were used to develop 
models to predict the time window when there is a high risk of multiple fire incidents in fire district 
#9 and also to determine the possible time window for fire engine pre-emptive reallocation from 
FS #2 or FS #8 to FS #9 to handle multiple fire incidents in fire district #9. The Cox proportional 
hazard model was used to predict variables such as the specific time of the day, season of the year, 
and type of fire incident that may be associated with a high risk of multiple incidents in fire district 
#9 and an overlapping time window of lower risk of multiple simultaneous incidents in fire districts 
#2 and #8. 
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CHAPTER 5:   ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
5.1.   Descriptive Data Analysis 
The integrated incident data were converted into multiple comma-separate values (csv) files and 
imported into R-Language to generate various charts to represent the trend and nature of the data 
received.  
 
5.1.1.   Incident Statistics  
The bar plot in Figure 5-10a and 5-10b shows the total number of incidents by year and 
season with a steady trend from 2009 to 2013. There were an average of 4,542 incidents per year 
with fewer incidents recorded in winter. Figure 5-10c shows April and May as the peak months 
for incidents recorded. The bar and clock plot in Figure 5-10d and 5-10e shows incident by day 
of week and hour of the day. Most incidents occurred between 1100hrs and 2200hrs.  
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                       (b)                                                                             
 
 41 
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d)      
                                                                        
 
 
(e) 
Figure 5-10. Total Number of Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
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Alarm incidents recorded an increasing trend from 2010 to 2013 as shown in Figure 5-11a 
with an average of 1,707 incidents per year. There were no clear peak seasons for alarm incidents. 
Figure 5-11c and 5-11d show no clear peak number in Alarm incidents per month and days of 
week. Figure 5-11e shows clock plot of Alarm incident by hour of the day. Most incidents 
occurred between 10am and 9pm 
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                       (b)              
                                                                
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d)                                                                             
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(e) 
Figure 5-11. Alarm Reported Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
(e) Hour of Day 
 
As shown in Figure 5-12a 2009 recorded the highest number of incidents reported as Fire 
with an average of 1,073 incidents per year. Spring and summer season recorded the highest 
number of incidents. Figure 5-12c shows that May recorded the highest number of Fire reported 
incident. Saturday and Sunday recorded the highest number of incidents as shown in Figure 5-
12d. Figure 5-12e shows clock plot of Fire incident by day of week and hour of the day. Most 
incidents occurred between 8am and 11pm. 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b)              
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d)              
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(e) 
Figure 5-12. Fire Reported Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week and 
(e) Hour of Day 
 
As shown in Figure 5-13a there was a decrease in trend from 2009 to 2013 for Dangerous 
goods incidents with an average of 1,761 incidents per year. Spring shows the highest number of 
incidents recorded for Dangerous goods incident. Figure 5-13c shows that April recorded the 
highest number of Dangerous goods Incidents. There were few incidents recorded on Sundays in 
Figure 5-13d. Figure 5-13e shows clock plot of incident by hour of the day. Most dangerous 
goods incidents occurred between 11am and 8pm. 
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                                    (a)                                                                      (b) 
    
                                    (c)                                                                      (d) 
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(e) 
Figure 5-13. Dangerous Goods Reported Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) 
Day of Week and (e) Hour of Day 
 
5.1.2.   Incident Statistics per Fire District 
The total number of incidents response per fire district are shown in Figure 5-14. There were at 
an average of 2,523 incidents per fire district. Fire district #1 recorded the highest number of 
incidents representing 32.1% of the total incidents.  
 
Figure 5-15a and 5-15b shows fire district #1 incidents by year and season. There were at 
an average of 1,423 incidents per year with fewer incidents recorded in winter. As shown in Figure 
5-15c the month of April recorded the highest number of incidents and fewer incidents in February. 
There was a steady trend in the number of incidents by day of the week. Figure 5-15e shows most 
incidents occurred between the hours from 9am to 8pm. 
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Figure 5-14. Number of Incidents Response per Fire District 
 
    
                                     (a)                                                                      (b) 
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                                     (c)                                                                      (d) 
 
 
(e) 
Figure 5-15. Fire District #1 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
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As shown in Figure 5-16a, fire district #2 recorded a steady trend from 2010 to 2013 with 
an average of 1,057 incidents per year. There were fewer incidents in winter compared to other 
seasons. Figure 5-16c shows the Month of April with the highest number of incidents. There was 
a steady trend in the number of incidents by day of the week. Figure 5-16e shows that most 
incidents in fire district #2 occurred between 10am to 9pm. 
    
                                    (a)                                                                    (b) 
    
                                      (c)                                                                     (d) 
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(e) 
Figure 5-16. Fire District #2 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
 
Figure 5-17a shows a steady trend from 2009 to 2013 and an average of 519 incidents per 
year in fire district #3. There were fewer incidents in winter compared to other seasons. Figure 5-
17c shows the April and May recorded the highest number of incidents. There was a steady trend 
in the number of incidents by day of the week as shown in Figure 5-17d.  Figure 5-17e shows that 
most incidents occurred between 9am to 11pm. 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d) 
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(e) 
Figure 5-17. Fire District #3 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
 
As shown in Figure 5-18a, fire district # 4 recorded a steady trend from 2010 to 2013 with 
an average of 370 incidents per year. There were fewer incidents in winter compared to other 
seasons. Figure 5-18c shows the Month of April with the highest number of incidents. There was 
a steady trend in the number of incidents by day of the week. Figure 5-18e shows that most 
incidents in fire district #4 occurred between 8am to 9pm. 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d) 
 55 
 
 
(e) 
Figure 5-18. Fire District #4 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
 
Figure 5-19a shows a steady trend from 2009 to 2013 and an average of 242 incidents per 
year in fire district #5. Summer and fall recorded the highest number of incidents compared to 
other seasons. Figure 5-19c shows a steady trend in number of incidents by months. Tuesday and 
Wednesday recorded the highest number of incidents compared to other days of the week.  Figure 
5-19e shows that most incidents occurred between 9am to 12am. 
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(a)                                                                       (b) 
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d) 
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(e) 
Figure 5-19. Fire District #5 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
 
Figure 5-20a shows a steady trend from 2009 to 2013 and an average of 364 incidents per 
year for fire district #6. Spring and summer recorded the highest number of incidents compared to 
other seasons. Figure 5-20c shows a steady trend in the number of incidents by month and by day 
of the week. Figure 5-20e shows that most incidents in fire district #6 occurred between 11am to 
10pm. 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d) 
 
 
(e) 
Figure 5-20. Fire District # 6 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
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As shown in Figure 5-21a, 2013 recorded the highest number of incidents and an average 
of 188 incidents per year in fire district #7. Spring and summer recorded the highest number of 
incidents compared to other seasons. Figure 5-21c shows May and July recorded the highest 
number of incidents. There were fewer incidents recorded on Sunday compared to other days of 
the week.  Figure 5-21e shows that most incidents occurred between 8am to 11pm. 
    
                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d) 
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(e) 
Figure 5-21. Fire District #7 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
 
As shown in Figure 5-22a 2013 recorded the highest number of incidents and an average 
of 54 incidents per year for fire district #8. Summer and fall recorded the highest number of 
incidents compared to other seasons. Figure 5-22c shows May, August, October and December 
recorded the highest number of incidents. Figure 5-22d shows Monday, Thursday and Sunday 
recorded the highest incidents. Figure 5-22e shows that most incidents in fire district #8 occurred 
between 8am to 11pm. 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d) 
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(e) 
Figure 5-22. Fire District # 8 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
 
As shown in Figure 5-23a, there was an increasing trend in incidents from 2009 to 2013 
and an average of 213 incidents per year in fire district #9. Summer and fall recorded the highest 
number of incidents compared to other seasons. Figure 5-23c shows no clear peak months in 
number of incidents recorded. There was a steady trend in the number of incidents by days of the 
week.  Figure 5-23e shows that most incidents occurred between 9am to 12am. 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
 
    
                                    (c)                                                                       (d) 
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(e) 
Figure 5-23. Fire District #9 Incidents by (a) Year (b) Season (c) Month (d) Day of Week 
and (e) Hour of Day 
 
5.1.3.   Response Time Statistics per Fire District 
The response time shown in Figure 5-24a for most incidents in fire district #1 was 4 - 6 minutes. 
The number of incidents recorded within the four-minute target response time was 1,170 (16%). 
Figure 5-24b shows the response time for most incidents in fire district #2 was 6 - 8 minutes. The 
number of incidents recorded within the four minutes’ target response time’ was 432 (8%).  
As shown in Figure 5-25a, the response time for most incidents in fire district #3 was 4 - 
6 minutes. The number of incidents recorded within the four-minute target response time was 221 
(8%). Figure 5-25b shows the response time for most incidents in fire district #4 was 6 - 8 minutes. 
The number of incidents recorded within the four minutes’ target response time was 126 (6%).  
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
Figure 5-24. Response Time for Incidents in (a) Fire District #1 and (b) Fire District #2 
   
    
                                    (a)                                                                       (b)                               
Figure 5-25. Response Time for Incidents in (a) Fire District #3 and (b) Fire District #4 
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Figure 5-26a shows the response time for most incidents in fire district #5 was 4 - 6 
minutes. The number of incidents recorded within the four-minute target response time was 107 
(8%). Figure 5-26b shows the response time for most incidents in fire district #6 was 6 - 8 minutes. 
The number of incidents recorded within the four minutes’ target response time was 105 (6%).  
Figure 5-27a shows the response time for most incidents in fire district #7 was 6 - 8 
minutes. The number of incidents recorded within the four minutes’ target response time was 50 
(5%). Figure 5-27b shows the response time for most incidents in fire district #8 was 4 - 6 minutes. 
The number of incidents recorded within the four minutes’ target response time was 31 (11%).  
Figure 5-28 shows the response time for most incidents in fire district #9 was 6 - 8 minutes. 
The number of incidents recorded within the four minutes’ target response time was 66 (6%). 
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                       (b)                               
Figure 5-26. Response Time for Incidents in (a) Fire District #5 and (b) Fire District #6 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b)                               
Figure 5-27. Response Time for Incidents in (a) Fire District #7 and (b) Fire District #8   
 
 
Figure 5-28. Response Time for Incidents in Fire District #9 
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The analysis result on investigating the impact of grade crossing blockage, fire equipment 
allocation and multiple incident occurrences on emergency response time were grouped under two 
case studies. Case study 1 shows GIS-based data analysis results and Case study 2 shows survival 
data analysis results. 
 
5.2.   Case Study 1: GIS-Based Data Analysis Results 
To investigate the impact of GCMS on emergency response time, the research study analyzed two 
different situations: Grade crossing blockages due to stationary trains and blockages due to slow 
moving trains. Montgomery and Saskatoon downtown were chosen as typical subjects of 
blockages due to stationary trains and slow moving trains, respectively. 
GIS-based service area (SA) and network analysis (NA) spatial data were used. SAA was 
used to investigate the dynamic impact of a grade crossing blockage on the service area. The NA 
was used to examine the network when there is no train blockage at grade crossings and when 
there is blockages. This analysis compares the network route(s) available to dispatches with or 
without GCMS. The results are as follows. 
5.2.1.   Grade Crossing Blockage due to Stationary Train 
Figure 5-29 shows Fire Station (FS) #2 and its response district. FS #2 has the primary 
responsibility for incidents in Montgomery. To reach an incident in Montgomery, the station’s fire 
engines must cross at least one of the three grade crossings, as shown in Figure 5-29. 
5.2.2.   Service Area Analysis  
Figure 5-29a shows the estimated SA for FS #2 when there is no grade crossing blockage 
(default circumstance). As shown in Figure 5-29a, Montgomery area is 3.57 km2 of which only 
0.97 km2 (27%) can be reached within four minutes (dark blue). The remaining 2.60 km2 (73%) 
of Montgomery can be reached in four to six minutes. 
Figure 5-29b shows the SA for FS #2 when there is a train blockage at one or more than 
one grade crossing. The distance between grade crossing 1 and 2 is 1.6 km, and these two crossings 
are sometimes blocked simultaneously by a long freight train. Figure 5-29b shows the estimated 
SA when grade crossing 1 and 2 are blocked simultaneously. Most of Montgomery now lies within 
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a six to ten minute response time (light blue) representing 2.63 km2.The four-minute response zone 
has disappeared (reduced from 0.97 km2 to 0.00 km2). Fire engines from FS #2 take the long detour 
via grade crossing 3. As a result, most Montgomery residents must wait more than six minutes and 
possibly up to 10 minutes for a FS #2 fire engine to arrive at an emergency. This clearly is a serious 
safety and security issue for Montgomery area. 
 
 
Figure 5-29. Fire Station #2's Varying Service Area Due to Stationary Train 
 
5.2.3.   Network Analysis 
Figure 5-30 shows FS #2 fire engine dispatch routes to Montgomery are without grade crossing 
blockage (the default circumstance). Figure 5-30a shows the route without GCMS information 
and Figure 5-30b shows the routes with GCMS information. The primary route (PR) (dotted red 
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line) represents the first fire engine dispatched and the secondary route (SR) (blue line) represents 
the second fire engine dispatched. Due an unknown crossing blockage, it is standard practice for 
the SR to take a different route to avoid a delay on the PR route.  
FS #2 dispatchers anticipate that grade crossing 1 is frequently blocked due to marshaling 
of trains and therefore do not dispatch fire engines through grade crossing 1 to Montgomery. 
Assuming there is no grade crossing blockage and no GCMS, Figure 5-30a shows that the PR (the 
first fire engine) takes 9.1 minutes. The SR (the second fire engine) takes 10.5 minutes. 
Figure 5-30b shows the change in dispatch routes with a real-time GCMS information 
showing that the assumption that grade crossing 1 is blocked by a stationary train is inaccurate as 
there is actually no blockage at the crossing. The PR now use grade crossing 1 and takes 3.5 
minutes. FS #2 fulfills the target response time of 4 minutes and saves 5.6 minutes, arriving 60% 
faster than when there is no real-time GCMS information. The SR uses grade crossing 2 and takes 
9.1 minutes. GCMS reduces the total response time by 35.7%, when there is no grade crossing 
blockage on the network. This shows a significant reduction in response time for first responders.  
Figure 5-31 shows FS #2 fire engine dispatch routes to Montgomery when there is a grade 
crossing blockage. Figure 5-31a shows what the dispatch routes when FS #2 dispatchers have no 
real-time GCMS information and two fire engines are dispatched. The engines use the routes 
shown in Figure 5-31a, but the PR engine realizes that grade crossing 2 is blocked and has to take 
a long detour, taking a total of 11.8 minutes to reach the incident.  
The SR engine is not affected. The total time for the PR and SR routes is 22.3 minutes. 
Figure 5-31b shows the result when dispatchers have real-time GCMS information that grade 
crossing 2 is blocked before the first engine is dispatched from the station. Dispatchers can then 
use the routes shown in Figure 5-31b. With a blockage at grade crossing 2, the total time for the 
PR and SR routes is now 17.0 minutes, a saving of 5.3 minutes (23.7%) due to the GCMS. 
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Figure 5-30. Fire Engine Dispatch Routes to Montgomery with no Grade Crossing 
Blockage: without GCMS and with GCMS 
 
 72 
 
 
Figure 5-31. Fire Engine Dispatch Routes to Montgomery with Grade Crossing Blockage: 
without GCMS and with GCMS 
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5.2.4.   Grade Crossing Blockage due to a Slow Moving Train 
Figure 5-32 shows the location of FS #1 in Saskatoon’s downtown business and commercial area. 
The Saskatoon downtown main rail line tracks are usually notable for blockages due to slow 
moving trains rather than stationary trains. Figure 5-32 shows the seven grade crossings, all to the 
north west of the fire station. It is assumed that a 2.2 km long freight train is moving at 40 km/h. 
The average length of a freight train is 2.2 km, and the usual speed of a freight train in Saskatoon 
is 40 km/h. 
5.2.5.   Service Area Analysis 
Figure 5-32a shows the estimated SA of FS #1 when there is no grade crossing blockage (the 
default scenario). During blockage, the four-minute target response area (dark blue) is about 4.7 
km2 (i.e., northwest of the mainline rail track). The response area for the four to six minutes 
(medium blue) is about 7.2 km2. 
Figure 5-32b assumes that all crossings are between grade crossing 1 and 7 are 
simultaneously blocked by a slow moving freight train. The distance between grade crossing 1 and 
grade crossing 7 is only 1.4 km and can be blocked simultaneously by a freight train. When a train 
arrives at grade crossing 1, it takes only a few minutes to reach grade crossing 7 from grade 
crossing 1 and first responders at FS #1 know that all seven crossings will be blocked (It takes 
approximately 3.3 minutes at 40 km/h.). The four-minute response area is only 0.5 km2 (reduced 
by 90%) when the crossings are blocked. The response area for the six minute is only 5.8 km2 
(reduced by 19%). 
 
 74 
 
 
Figure 5-32. Fire Station #1's Varying Service Area Due to Slow Moving Train 
 
5.2.6.   Network Analysis 
In the NA for the downtown area, the focus is only on the primary dispatch route while a secondary 
route is not considered. In the downtown area, there are many similar alternative routes available 
(unlike Montgomery the secondary route can be very different from the primary route because 
alternative routes are limited). Figure 5-33a shows a possible primary dispatch route (blue line) 
to an incident northwest of the fire station from FS #1 when there is no grade crossing blockage 
(the default circumstance).  
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The fastest route to an incident with or without a GCMS is the same, as dispatchers can use 
Idylwyld Drive (a major arterial) which provides a relatively fast and suitable driving environment 
for emergency dispatches to an incident. The route takes 3.2 minutes and satisfies the four-minute 
target both with and without GCMS. 
Figure 5-33b shows how the dispatch route changes without GCMS (dotted red line) and 
with GCMS (green line). When there is no real-time GCMS information, the FS #1 fire engine 
travels 650 m north on Idylwyld Drive (one minute), but dispatchers notice that grade crossing 1 
is blocked by a slow moving train. Dispatchers knows that routes to the west are also blocked by 
the train and then has to detour to the east. The journey takes six minutes (2.8 minutes longer than 
when there is no grade crossing blockage).  
With real-time GCMS information on blockage times, however, the fire engine dispatcher 
may for example, be notified that two minutes after the fire engine is dispatched from the station, 
grade crossing 1 will be reopened. In this situation, the engine can wait at grade crossing 1 for one 
minute and then proceed to the incident on the shortest route (the green line) reaching the incident 
in 4.2 minutes (3.2 minutes travel time plus one minute waiting time).  
The responders arrive in slightly longer time than the four-minute target response time, but 
save 1.8 minutes (30%) compared with the six minutes without real-time GCMS information. The 
1.8minute gain can be useful when lives are at stake, time saved in response could make a 
tremendous difference. 
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Figure 5-33. Fire Engine Dispatch Routes in Saskatoon Downtown Area 
 
5.2.7.   Fire Response Equipment Allocation 
Tanker apparatus are located at fire stations #2 and # 5. Tanker #2 responds to incidents requiring 
tanker apparatus in the central, north and west divisions. These divisions cover an estimated area 
of 101.64 km2. Tanker #5 responds to incidents in the east division with an estimated area of 
112.78 km2. Figure 5-34 shows the estimated Service Area for stations # 2 and #5. The four-
minute response time for Tanker dispatch from station #2 covers an area of 18.10 km2 or 17.8 % 
of the estimated central, north and west division’s area. The fou-rminutes response time for Tanker 
dispatch from station #5 covers 19.6 km2 or 17.4 % of the estimated east division area.  
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Ladders #1 and #8 are located at fire stations #1 and # 8 respectively. Ladder #1 responds 
to incidents requiring a Ladder in the central, north and west divisions. Ladder #8 responds to 
incidents in the east division. Figure 5-35 shows the estimated Service Area for stations # 1 and 
#8. The four-minute response time for Ladder dispatch from station #1 covers an area of 18.10 
km2 or 17.8 % of the estimated area of central, north and west division’s area. The four-minute 
response time for Ladder dispatch from station #8 covers an area of 12.60 km2 or 11.2 % of the 
estimated east division area.  
The Decontamination (Decon) apparatus is located at fire station #9. This apparatus 
responds to Decontamination related incidents in all four divisions. Figure 5-36 shows the 
estimated Service Area for station #9. The four-minute response time for Decon dispatch from 
station #9 covers an area of 16.6 km2, or 7.7 % of the estimated area of all four divisions. 
Hazmat and Trailer apparatus are both located at fire station #7. The apparatus responds to 
Hazmat and Trailer related incidents in all four divisions. Figures 5-37a and 5-37b show the 
estimated Service Area for station #7. The four-minute response time for Hazmat and Trailer 
dispatch from station #7 covers an area of 9.10 km2, or 4.2% of the estimated area of all four 
divisions. 
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Figure 5-34. Fire Station #2 and #5 Service Area for Tanker Dispatch to Fire Incidents 
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Figure 5-35. Fire Station #1 and #8 Service Area for Ladder Dispatch to Fire Incidents 
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Figure 5-36. Fire Station #9 Service Area for Decontamination Dispatch to Fire Incidents 
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(a) 
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(b) 
Figure 5-37. Fire Station #7 Service Area for (a) Hazmat and (b) Trailer Dispatch to Fire 
Incidents 
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5.3.   Case Study 2: Survival Data Analysis Results  
This analysis was used to predict the time periods with a relatively high risk of multiple incidents 
in fire district #9, the demand fire district. The analysis also considered the type of incident most 
likely to occur during a set of multiple incidents. First, the Kaplan-Meier estimators were used to 
check whether the different categories of the input variables used were statistically significant. The 
Log-Rank and Wilcoxon tests were used. Table 5-8 presents the results. As the p-values for both 
test statistics were less than 0.05, it can be concluded that there were statistically significant 
differences between the Kaplan-Meier estimators for the categories of each input variable 
considered.  
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate curves in Figure 5-38 show the probability of multiple 
incidents occurring in fire district #9. The survival probabilities decrease over time. Figure 5-38 
shows the Kaplan-Meier estimator curves for (a) peak/non-peak hours, (b) days of the week and 
(c) season of the year. Figure 5-38d shows the Kaplan-Meier estimator curves for the type of 
incident.  
The lower or lowest curve in each of the four comparisons shows the higher or highest 
probability of multiple incidents. In Figure 5-38a for example, the comparison of the curves shows 
that multiple incident occurrences in fire district #9 are more likely during peak hours (blue curve) 
than during non-peak hours (red curve). 
Figure 5-38 (a), (b), and (c) shows that the most likely times for multiple incidents to occur 
in fire district #9 are during peak hours, at the weekend and in summer. Figure 5-38(d) shows that 
when multiple incidents occur, the most likely type of incident is an alarm incident. 
Table 5-8. Test of Equality over Strata 
Test Chi2 DF p-value 
Log-Rank 9.902 1 0.001 
Wilcoxon 15.238 1 <.001 
-2Log(LR) 42.088 1 <.001 
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                                    (a)                                                                       (b) 
    
                                       (c)                                                                       (d) 
Figure 5-38. KM Survival Probabilities Curve for (a) Peak/nonpeak Hours (b) Days of the 
Week (c) Seasons and (d) Type of Incident for Fire District #9 
                                     
5.3.1.   Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimate for Fire District #9 
To fit a Cox proportional hazard model, the Kaplan-Meier estimators for all four variables (peak 
hours, weekend, summer and alarm) which were statistically significant (Table 5-8), were added 
to the Cox hazard model. The purpose of the Cox hazard model analysis was to examine the impact 
of each of the four variables on the risk of multiple incidents occurring in fire district #9. The 
maximum likelihood estimation method was used to estimate the parameter values (i.e., 𝛽𝑖  ) of the 
model. Equation 5-4 shows the hazards model developed for fire district #9. 
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ln {
ℎ𝑖(𝑡)
ℎ0(𝑡)
} = 0.327𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 + 0.143𝑋𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 + 0.212𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 0.533𝑋𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 
                                                                                                                                             Equation      [5-4] 
where: 
 𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 = variable for peak hour; 
 𝑋𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 = variable for summer; 
 𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 = variable for weekends; and 
 𝑋𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚  = variable for alarm incidents. 
Table 5-9a presents the results of the tests of statistical significance obtained from the 
Cox hazard model for fire district #9.  
Table 5-9a. Testing Global Null Hypothesis: β=0 for Fire District #9 
Test Chi2 DF p-value 
Likelihood Ratio 87.629 4 <.001 
Score 88.271 4 <.001 
Wald 87.063 4 <.001 
 
 
Table 5-9b. Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Fire District #9 
Parameter 
Parameter 
Estimate(β) 
Standard 
Error 
Chi2 p-value 
Hazard 
Ratio 
95% Hazard Ratio 
Confidence Limits 
Peak hour 0.327 0.083 15.586 <.001 1.386 1.179 1.630 
Summer 0.143 0.071 4.104 0.043 1.154 1.005 1.325 
Weekends 0.212 0.068 9.756 0.002 1.236 1.082 1.412 
Alarm 0.533 0.064 68.759 <.001 1.704 1.503 1.933 
 
 
Table 5-9a shows the results of the three goodness of fit tests. The p-value for each of the 
three test statistics is less than 0.05 which means that each goodness of fit test easily rejects the 
null hypothesis (that all 𝛽𝑖  = 0) at the 95% confidence level. Table 5-9b shows that the parameters 
estimated for peak hours (10 am to 11 pm), for summer, for weekend and for alarm incident are 
all statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. As each estimate is positive (𝛽𝑖 > 0), we 
can conclude that all four contribute to an increase in the risk of multiple incidents occurring in 
fire district #9. For example, the Cox hazard ratio for peak hours is 1.386. This means that the risk 
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of multiple incidents occurring in district #9 during peak hours is 38.6% higher than during non-
peak hours. Similarly, summer has a 15.4% higher risk than the other seasons, weekends have a 
23.6% higher risk than weekdays, and alarm incidents have a 70.4% higher risk of occurring than 
do fire or DG incidents). 
To summarize the analysis for fire district #9, multiple incidents are most likely to occur 
during peak hours (10 am to 11 pm), weekends and summer, and the most likely type of incident 
is an alarm incident.  
 
 
5.3.2.   Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimate for Fire District #2 and #8 
The study developed Cox proportional hazard model to predict the time periods when there is a 
relatively low risk of multiple incidents in fire districts #2 and #8, the supplier fire districts. The 
analysis also considered the type of incident most likely to occur during a set of multiple incidents.   
In the analysis of the two supplier fire districts (districts #2 and #8), the analysis was 
focused on the time periods fire district #9 was most likely to need help (i.e., peak hours, summer, 
and weekends) and the type of incident most likely to occur during multiple incidents (i.e., alarm 
incidents). The study investigated whether one (or both) of the supplier fire districts has a relatively 
low risk of multiple alarm incidents during the target time periods. To do this, Cox hazards models 
were developed. Equation 5-5 shows the Cox hazard model developed for supplier fire district 
#2.    
ln {
ℎ𝑖(𝑡)
ℎ0(𝑡)
} = −0.101𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 + 0.242𝑋𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 + 0.110𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 0.082𝑋𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 
                                                                                                                                             Equation      [5-5] 
where: 
 𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 = variable for peak hour; 
 𝑋𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 = variable for summer; 
 𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 = variable for weekends; and 
 𝑋𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚  = variable for alarm incidents. 
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Table 5-10a presents the results of the tests of statistical significance for the Cox hazard 
model for fire district #2.  
Table 5-10a. Testing Global Null Hypothesis: β =0 for Fire District #2 
Test Chi2 DF p-value 
Likelihood Ratio 153.050 4 <.001 
Score 142.290 4 <.001 
Wald 139.888 4 <.001 
 
 
Table 5-10b. Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Fire District #2 
Parameter 
Parameter 
Estimate(β) 
Standard 
Error 
Chi2 p-value 
Hazard 
Ratio 
95% Hazard Ratio 
Confidence Limits 
Peak hour -0.101 0.038 7.262 0.007 0.904 0.840 0.973 
Summer 0.242 0.041 35.133 <.001 1.273 1.176 1.379 
Weekends 0.110 0.040 7.683 0.006 1.116 1.033 1.207 
Alarm -0.082 0.038 4.538 0.033 0.921 0.855 0.993 
 
 
Table 5-10a shows that the results of all three goodness-of-fit test statistics for fire district 
#2 are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (i.e., p-value < 0.05). This means that 
at least one 𝛽𝑖 ≠ 0. Table 5-10b shows that the parameter estimated for peak hours (10 am to 11 
pm), for summer, for weekend and for alarm incident are all statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level, but two of the parameter estimates (peak hours and alarm) are negative (𝛽i < 0). 
The parameter estimates for summer and weekend are positive (𝛽i > 0). It is therefore expected 
that for fire district #2, the risk of multiple incidents occurring during peak hours and involving an 
alarm incident is decreased while the risk of multiple incidents during the weekend and during 
summer is increased.  
Table 5-10b also shows that the Cox hazard ratio for peak hours and alarm is 0.904 and 
0.921 respectively. These results suggest that in fire district #2, there is a 9.6% lower risk of 
multiple incidents during peak hours than during non-peak hours, and a 7.9% lower risk of multiple 
incidents involving alarm incidents compared to the risk of multiple incidents involving fire or DG 
incidents. The risk of multiple incidents is however, 27.3% higher during the summer than during 
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the other seasons, and the risk of multiple incidents is 11.6% higher during the weekend than on 
weekdays.  
Table 5-11a presents the results of the tests of statistical significance for the Cox hazard 
model for fire district #8. Equation 5-6 shows the Cox hazard model developed for supplier fire 
district #8: 
ln {
ℎ𝑖(𝑡)
ℎ0(𝑡)
} = −0.152𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 − 0.115𝑋𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 − 0.113𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 0.264𝑋𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 
                                                                                                                                                   Equation     [5-6] 
where: 
 𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 = variable for peak hour; 
 𝑋𝑆𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟 = variable for summer; 
 𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑑 = variable for weekends; and 
 𝑋𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚  = variable for alarm incidents. 
 
 
Table 5-11a. Testing Global Null Hypothesis: β =0 for Fire District #8 
Test Chi2 DF p-value 
Likelihood Ratio 14.695 4 0.005 
Score 14.823 4 0.005 
Wald 14.657 4 0.006 
 
 
Table 5-11b. Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Fire District #8 
Parameter 
Parameter 
Estimate(β) 
Standard 
Error 
Chi2 p-value 
Hazard 
Ratio 
95% Hazard Ratio 
Confidence Limits 
Peak hour -0.152 0.167 0.831 0.005 0.859 0.619 1.191 
Summer -0.115 0.040 8.319 0.004 0.892 0.825 0.964 
Weekends -0.113 0.147 0.592 0.010 0.893 0.670 1.191 
Alarm -0.264 0.155 2.888 0.002 0.768 0.566 1.041 
 
 
Table 5-11a shows that the results of all three goodness-of-fit test statistics for fire district 
#8 are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (i.e., p-value < 0.05). This means that 
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at least one 𝜷𝒊 ≠ 0. Table 5-11b shows that the parameter estimated for peak hours (10 am to 11 
pm), for summer, for weekend and for alarm incident are all statistically is statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. Each parameter is negative. This means that all four contributed to 
reducing the risk of multiple incidents in fire district #8.  
 
The Cox hazard ratios shown in Table 5-11b suggest that in fire district #8, the risk of 
multiple incidents is 14.1% lower during peak hours than during non-peak hours, 10.8% lower 
during the summer than during the other seasons, and 10.7% lower during the weekend than on 
weekdays. The risk of multiple incidents involving alarm incidents is 23.2% lower than the risk of 
multiple incidents involving fire or DG incidents 
 
 
5.4.   Chapter Summary 
The analysis results from this research show how emergency response time is affected by grade 
crossing blockage, the allocation of fire equipment with special features and the risk in the 
occurrences of multiple incidents in fire district #9. The service area analysis in Montgomery area 
shows that out of a service area of 3.57 km2, only 0.97 km2 can be reached by fire station #2 within 
the four-minutes target response time when there is no blockage. When there is a train blockage, 
no area in Montgomery can be reached within four-minutes target response time. Most parts of 
Montgomery area (2.63 km2) can now be reached from six to 10 minutes. This clearly shows the 
impact of grade crossing blockage.  
The network analysis in Montgomery area shows the impact of grade crossing blockage on 
the response time with or without real-time information from a GCMS. When there is no blockage, 
since the fire department does not have a real-time information of the conditions at the crossing in 
Montgomery, they anticipate a blockage and it takes the primary route (the first fire engine) and 
secondary routes (the second fire engine) 9.1 minutes and 10.5 minutes respectively. With a real-
time information from a GCMS, the assumption that there is a blockage by a train is incorrect and 
it takes 3.5 minutes for the primary route and 9.1 minutes for the secondary route, saving 5.6 
minutes (62%) for the primary route and 1.4 minutes (13%) for the secondary route. These results 
clearly demonstrate the impact of grade closing blockage on emergency response time and the 
benefit of installing a grade crossing monitoring system to improve emergency response time. 
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The service area analysis for fire equipment that has special features show how the four-
minute response time target is not achieved due to the allocation of special fire engines such as 
tanker, ladder, decontamination, hazmat and trailer. The four-minute response time for Tanker 
dispatch from station #2 and #5 covers only an area of 18.10 km2 (17.8 %) of the estimated area 
for the entire west fire districts and 19.6 km2 (17.4 %) for the east fire districts. The response area 
for Ladder #1 and #8 covers an area of 18.10 km2 (17.8 %) of the estimated area west fire districts 
and 12.60 km2 (11.2 %) of the estimated area for the east fire districts. The four-minute response 
time for Decontamination equipment covers an area of 16.6 km2 (7.7 %) of the estimated area of 
all nine fire districts.  
The survival data analysis was used to develop models designed to determine the time 
window of multiple incidents in fire district #9 and the overlapping time window for fire engine 
pre-emptive reallocation from FS#2 or FS#8 to FS#9. The survival analysis showed that fire 
district #9 (the demand district) may require the pre-emptive reallocation of an additional fire 
engine during peak hours (10 am to 11 pm), the summer and weekends. In addition, the analysis 
of fire district #9 showed that multiple incidents are more likely to involve alarm incidents than 
fire or DG incidents.  
The survival analysis showed important differences between the two supplier fire districts 
analyzed. Both districts might be able to provide a secondary fire engine to fire district #9, but fire 
district #8 is the more promising district. During the time periods when fire district #9 is expected 
to experience a higher risk of multiple incidents (with alarm incidents being the most likely), fire 
district #8 is expected to experience a lower risk of multiple incidents. Fire district #2, however, is 
expected to have an increase in the risk of multiple incidents in the summer and at weekends  
The output from the analysis shows that the fire department can pre-empt a fire engine 
from fire district #8 to fire district #9 because of the 23.0% less chances of an Alarm incident in 
fire district #8 compared to 70.4% in fire district #9. Fire station #8 is equipped with a ladder fire 
engine which is a required fire equipment for an Alarm incident. 
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CHAPTER 6:   DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1.   Case Study 1: GIS-Based Data Analysis  
This research clearly demonstrates the impact of grade crossing blockages, fire equipment 
allocation and the risk of multiple incident occurrences on emergency response time. Grade 
crossing blockages increase first responders’ response times and decrease the service area that can 
be reached within the four-minute target response time. The analysis of Saskatoon downtown and 
Montgomery area shows how stationary and slow moving trains affect the service area and 
increases response times, and how these response times could be considerably reduced by using a 
GCMS.  
The Montgomery residential area analysis shows that, the fire station (FS #2) has four 
different routes available, but three of these routes pass through a grade crossing which are 
sometimes blocked. Two of these routes can be blocked simultaneously by a long freight train. 
When emergency dispatchers lack real-time grade crossing blockage information and the most 
direct route to Montgomery is frequently blocked, they assume that there is a blockage on these 
routes and automatically dispatch the first and second fire engines on the two longer routes. The 
network analysis examples in Montgomery show that the Fire Department is then unable to meet 
its target response time of four minutes. When there is no crossing blockage the response time is 
increased by 5.6minute relative to what it would have been if fire engines had been dispatched 
along the shortest routes. When there is a grade crossing blockage, lack of real-time information 
on blocked crossings means that the engine that dispatchers would have to be delayed by a further 
5.3 minutes to detour.  
Incidents located on the north-west side of the downtown area near FS #1 are affected by 
blockages on any of seven grade crossings caused by slow moving freight trains (see Figure 5-
32). The network analysis shows that dispatchers would choose to wait at a crossing for a blockage 
to open when the GCMS indicates that waiting would be more efficient than taking a detour route. 
The Saskatoon downtown network analysis example shows a time saving of 1.8 minutes (30%) 
with a GCMS system.   
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The permanent solution to grade crossing blockages is grade separation, but it is very costly 
and cannot be justified at the great majority of level crossings in North America. Grade separation 
will not be feasible in the Central Saskatoon downtown due to the dense network. GCMS provides 
a promising alternative approach for emergency responders when choosing the fastest dispatch 
route to reach an incident.  
The analysis results from this research cannot be directly transferred to other areas in 
Saskatoon, even though the analysis shows the benefits of a GCMS for two test locations in the 
city. First responders have their own approaches when dispatching a fire engine to an incident in 
an area and also every area has its own road and rail network. The study shows that GCMS can 
help reduce emergency response. It should be noted though that, the impact of grade crossing 
blockages on first responders’ response times for different towns and cities vary.  
The Service Area analysis on fire engines with special features clearly showed that 
approximately (80%) of incidents occur beyond the four-minute target response time. This raises 
serious safety and security concerns. Given the number of incidents requiring Tanker and Ladder 
response in the four divisions, additional Tanker and Ladder apparatus could be allocated to fire 
stations within the central and west divisions.  
The Service Area analysis of fire stations #7and #9, which serve all the fire divisions for 
Hazmat, Trailer and Decontamination equipment, showed that additional specific engines could 
be allocated to other fire stations to help improve response times. Specific fire equipment could be 
reallocated to other fire stations with higher incident rates to help improve response time.  
This research shows the need for additional specific engines such as Tanker and Ladder to 
be allocated to other fire stations and also a possible need to relocate some Hazmat, 
Decontamination and Trailer apparatus to other stations. The study should be of value to decision 
makers, especially council members, dealing with fire equipment allocation and the purchase of 
additional response apparatus for the Saskatoon Fire Department. Ultimately, the best allocation 
of fire emergency equipment will help improve target response times and will save lives and 
property. 
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6.2.   Case Study 2: Survival Data Analysis 
The survival analysis approach used in this study were the Kaplan-Meier survival probability 
estimator to develop the survival function and the Cox hazard model to develop the hazard 
function. Both techniques are widely used in transportation engineering. The analyses was focused 
on four input variables: time of day (peak hours vs. non-peak hours), season, day of the week 
(weekdays vs. weekends), and type of incident (alarm vs. fire vs. DG incidents). All four variables 
selected were statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 
One of the study’s objective was to develop a statistical model to predict the time of the 
day, of the week, season of the year, and type of fire incident associated with a higher risk of 
multiple incidents in a demand fire district. Saskatoon’s fire district #9 was the demand district. 
Another objective was to develop statistical models to predict the time of the day, of the week, 
season of the year, and type of fire incident associated with a lower risk of multiple incidents in a 
supplier fire district. The study compared two supplier districts: fire districts #2 and #8. The aim 
of this analysis was to demonstrate the potential for pre-emptive reallocation by matching the time 
periods of increased risk for multiple incidents in the demand district to one or more supplier 
districts with a decreased risk for multiple incidents during the same time periods.  
The study’s findings clearly identified fire district #9’s periods of greatest risk: peak hours 
(10 am to 11 pm), summer and weekends. The study also found that during these periods, there 
was an increase in the risk of alarm incidents (compared to the risk of fire or DG incidents). Fire 
district #8 emerged as the district most likely to be able to help fire district #9. Fire district #8 is 
expected to experience a lower risk of multiple incidents during each of the riskiest time periods 
for fire district #9. Fire district #2 is not suitable as a supplier district because fire district #2 is 
expected to have an increase in the risk of multiple incidents in the summer and at weekends.  
The study’s findings suggest that the Saskatoon Fire Department might wish to consider 
the pre-emptive reallocation of a ladder-equipped fire engine from fire district #8 to fire district #9 
during summer weekends from 10 am to 11 pm. This pre-emptive reallocation would help the 
Saskatoon Fire Department to fulfill its standard of dispatching two pump engines, a rapid 
intervention team and a ladder-equipped fire engine to all alarm incidents. This approach taken in 
this study can help improve the response time during multiple emergencies.  
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6.3.   Future Work 
This research was limited to investigating the benefit of installing GCMS to help improve response 
time without considering any analysis on the benefit/cost of installing a GCMS at selected grade 
crossings. The response area analysis on fire engines with special features was carried out based 
on the existing location of the fire engines with special features, and the analysis on risk in multiple 
incident occurrences was based on the Saskatoon Fire Departments’ current concerns in fire district 
#9 without considering all other districts. 
A rigorous analysis to determine the benefit/cost of installing a GCMS at a level crossing 
should be conducted. As transportation engineers, an analysis on how much it will cost to install, 
maintain and operate a specific GCMS system should be performed. When conducting analyses to 
estimate the benefits of reduced response times to incidents brought about by the introduction of 
the GCMS, an in-depth benefit/cost analysis is likely to raise significant challenges. 
There are some studies that have discussed the estimated cost of fire incidents in an 
aggregated form (Hall, 2014; ODPM, 2004, 2006) and this approach may be helpful to policy-
level decisions. Future research would consider producing more detailed estimates of the cost of 
fire damage, possibly by each type of fire incident. The more detailed approach could be used for 
the analysis benefit/cost of a fire department’s operation and for more detailed fire service policy 
decisions (such as, does a city need a more complex 911 call dispatching system that provide real-
time information on the blockage status of selected at-grade crossings in the city?). 
The response area analysis on fire equipment allocation indicates that not all fire districts’ 
service areas are covered within the four-minute target response time. There are instances where 
the four-minute response time service area of two or more fire districts can overlap while other 
service areas in the district are not covered. Future studies would consider an optimum allocation 
of some fire stations and fire engines with special features. This approach will ensure that a great 
part of each fire district service area can be covered within the four-minutes target response time. 
Future research would consider analyses on multiple incident occurrences in all nine fire 
districts to determine which time window a fire district will require pre-emptive reallocation of a 
fire engine from other fire districts to help improve the response time. 
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 APPENDIX A 
INCIDENT DURATION TIME  
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                      (b)                                                                             
Figure A-1. Duration Time for Incidents (a) Total and (b) Alarm    
 
    
                                   (a)                                                                      (b)                                                                             
Figure A-2. Duration Time for Incidents (a) Dangerous Goods and (b) Fire    
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 APPENDIX B 
INCIDENT RESPONSES BY FIRE EQUIPMENT WITH SPECIAL FEATURES  
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                      (b)                                                                             
Figure B-1. Incidents Responses with Ladder Equipment (a) Year and (b) Season    
 
    
                                   (a)                                                                      (b)                                                                             
Figure B-2. Incidents Responses with Ladder Equipment (a) Month and (b) Day of Week    
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Figure B-3. Incidents Responses with Ladder Equipment by Hour of Day    
 
    
                                   (a)                                                                      (b)                                                                             
Figure B-4. Incidents Responses with Tanker Equipment (a) Year and (b) Season    
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                                    (a)                                                                     (b)                                                                             
Figure B-5. Incidents Responses with Tanker Equipment (a) Month and (b) Day of Week    
 
 
Figure B-6. Incidents Responses with Tanker Equipment by Hour of Day    
 
 
 
 
 105 
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                     (b)                                                                             
Figure B-7. Incidents Responses with Decontamination Equipment (a) Year and (b) Season    
 
    
                                     (a)                                                                    (b)                                                                             
Figure B-8. Incidents Responses with Decontamination Equipment (a) Month and (b) Day 
of Week 
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Figure B-9. Incidents Responses with Decontamination Equipment by Hour of Day    
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                      (b)                                                                             
Figure B-10. Incidents Responses with Hazmat Equipment (a) Year and (b) Season    
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                                   (a)                                                                      (b)                                                                             
Figure B-11. Incidents Responses with Hazmat Equipment (a) Month and (b) Day of Week 
 
 
Figure B-12. Incidents Responses with Hazmat Equipment by Hour of Day    
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                                   (a)                                                                        (b)                                                                             
Figure B-13. Incidents Responses with Trailer Equipment (a) Year and (b) Season    
 
    
                                    (a)                                                                       (b)                                                                             
Figure B-14. Incidents Responses with Trailer Equipment (a) Month and (b) Day of Week 
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Figure B-15. Incidents Responses with Trailer Equipment by Hour of Day    
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 APPENDIX C 
RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS FOR SLOW MOVING TRAIN 
The SA analysis in Figure C-1a shows the estimated service area for FS#5 when there is no 
blockage. A service area of 11.32km2 can be reached within four minutes (chocolate). Assuming 
there is blockage, Figure C-1b shows the estimated SA of 8.54km2 that can be reached within the 
four minutes target response time. This shows that an estimated SA of 2.784km2 (26%) cannot be 
reached within four minutes due to train blockage. 
The network analysis in Figure C-2a shows the route to an incident when there is no grade 
crossing blockage and without GCMS. It takes a dispatched fire engine 2 minutes (blue line) to 
reach an incident from FS# 5. When there is a grade crossing blockage and no GCMS, Figure C-
2b shows the dispatch route from FS# 5 to an incident. The dispatched engine gets to the grade 
crossing and a train on the level crossing and has to take a detour which takes 8 minutes. Figure 
C-3 shows the change in route with a real-time information indicating that there is train on the 
grade crossing. It takes FS#5 7 minutes to reach an incident, saving 1 minutes. With GCMS, the 
fire department can call on FS#9 to respond to the incident which takes 3 minutes (dotted red line), 
saving 5 minutes.  
 
Figure C-1. Fire Station #5’s Varying Service Area Due to Slow Moving Train 
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Figure C-2. Fire Engine Dispatch Routes to an Incident with/without Grade Crossing 
Blockage and without GCMS 
 
 Figure C-3. Fire Engine Dispatch Routes to an Incident with/without Grade 
Crossing Blockage and with GCMS 
